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Introduction2 Chapter 1
Financial crises are characterised by the sudden and simultaneous materialisation
of risks that in tranquil times were believed to be independent. As a result, the op-
portunities for risk spreading are diminished when they are most needed, which can
pose a substantial threat to the stability of the ﬁnancial system. This effect was most
recently illustrated by ﬁnancial market developments since the course of 2007. What
at ﬁrst seemed to be a minor event in the US mortgage market, i.e. the default of a
number of sub-prime mortgage loans, evolved into the largest ﬁnancial crisis since the
Great Depression of the 1930s. In this crisis, stock markets plummeted, risk premiums
soared, money markets froze, ﬁnancial institutions went bankrupt, and even national
governments were on the brink of insolvency. While such events are rarely observed
individually, they have now come together in what has become known as the Global
Financial Crisis of 2007 and beyond.
The breakdown of risk spreading opportunities due to the simultaneous materiali-
sation of risks has caused investors and policy makers to fear that ﬁnancial instability
spills over between markets or ﬁnancial institutions as some sort of infectious disease,
with one or more distressed markets or institutions causing otherwise healthy ones to
become unstable as well. Borrowing a term from medicine, this phenomenon is re-
ferred to as contagion. Although the economic literature has not settled upon a precise
deﬁnition of ﬁnancial contagion (see Chapter 3 for a more elaborate discussion), policy
makers and the public at large generally consider ﬁnancial contagion to be the obvious
culprit once parts of the ﬁnancial system become unstable simultaneously.
Although both are often associated with one another, simultaneous instability of
ﬁnancial markets or institutions cannot by deﬁnition be attributed to ﬁnancial conta-
gion. After all, instead of instability of one market or institution causing the instability
of another, both can also be unstable due to a third factor, which we will refer to as
an adverse common shock. A natural example of a common shock is a sudden increase
in global investor risk aversion, which would lead stock markets across the world to
decline in value even when there are no economic linkages between them. Correlation
of instability thus does not imply contagion. In the context of a ﬁnancial crisis, the
analogy with a domino effect springs to mind: the dominoes can fall together because
one topples the other (contagion), or because a wind blow causes them to fall without
the dominoes interacting with each other (common shock). Both effects have differentIntroduction 3
implications for policy makers aiming to stabilise the ﬁnancial system. If contagion is
the main threat, stabilising one domino will also stabilise the others, while in the case
of a common shock, the dominoes can only be stabilised by closing the open window.
Thekeydifﬁcultytodistinguishempiricallybetweencontagionandcommonshocks
as causes for ﬁnancial instability is that many common shocks cannot be observed
directly. Empirical work on ﬁnancial market contagion therefore generally starts by
formulating a model of how these shocks could have evolved over time, and then
attributes any correlation between markets that cannot be explained by this model
to the impact of ﬁnancial contagion. In their seminal contribution, King and Wad-
hwani (1990), for instance, assume that the intensity of common shocks is constant
over time, and examine contagion by comparing correlation between markets dur-
ing ‘crisis’ times with correlation during ‘tranquil’ times. Forbes and Rigobon (2002)
however point out that the intensity of common shocks could increase during crisis
times, which would drive up the correlation between markets as well. They propose
to adjust the correlation statistic for this effect, but Corsetti, Pericoli, and Sbracia (2005)
show that the way the correlation should be adjusted depends crucially on which par-
ticular model of common shocks the researcher has in mind. As there are as many
preferred models as there are economists, the question of whether there is ﬁnancial
market contagion during crises remains heavily debated in the empirical literature.
The issue of how to control for common shocks carries over to the case where con-
tagion between ﬁnancial institutions is analysed. Especially banks are believed to be
vulnerable to contagion, for instance because of their mutual exposures and their sen-
sitivity to panic runs (De Bandt and Hartmann, 2002). Although empirical studies
conﬁrm that banks indeed tend to become unstable simultaneously, the 2007 Global
Financial Crisis being a noteworthy example, several studies question whether this is
really due to ﬁnancial contagion. Calomiris and Mason (1997) compare attributes of
failing and surviving banks during the Chicago panic of June 1932, and conclude that
the failures reﬂect the relative weakness of banks in the face of a common asset value
shock rather than contagion. Aharony and Swary (1983) ﬁnd that large bank failures
only affect other banks when caused by problems whose revelation is correlated across
banks, but not when due to bank-speciﬁc factors such as internal fraud. More recently,
Taylor (2009) and Huertas (2010) argue that even the near ﬁnancial meltdown after4 Chapter 1
the Lehman Brothers collapse on 15 September 2008 was not so much due to ﬁnancial
contagion, but was triggered by the common shock of investors’ sudden doubts about
the US government’s willingness and ability to bail-out troubled ﬁnancial institutions.
This thesis aims to add to the above literature by analysing to what extent simulta-
neous instability across ﬁnancial markets or institutions is due to ﬁnancial contagion,
and to what extent it is due to adverse common shocks. This question, rather than the
use of one single research method, binds the chapters of this thesis together. In fact, the
adopted research methods are quite diverse, with the next chapter being theoretical in
nature, and the other four being empirical.
Chapter 2 of this thesis focuses on the banking sector, where contagion during
ﬁnancial crises generally is believed to be omnipresent. Consequently, the banking
sector is a particularly interesting candidate to highlight the potential importance of
common shocks as alternative causes for ﬁnancial instability. To this end, abstaining
from any contagion effects, Chapter 2 asks the question what could be so special about
banks that they are more sensitive than other ﬁrms to the type of adverse common
shocks that can destabilise the sector as a whole? To provide an answer to this ques-
tion, the chapter develops a theoretical model around one other characteristic of banks
that makes them special compared to ordinary ﬁrms: their unique eligibility for liq-
uidity assistance provided by the central banks in their role as Lenders of Last Resort.
It is well known that the Lender of Last Resort facility gives banks an incentive to
engage in maturity transformation, i.e. to use short-term funds to ﬁnance their long-
term loans. At the same time, the consensus is that “where liquidity support clearly
can be separated from the provision of risk capital, the moral hazard created will be
limited to possible mismanagement of liquidity risk” (Freixas, Giannini, Hoggarth and
Soussa, 2000, p.73). However, Chapter 2 points out that through facilitating bank ma-
turity transformation, the Lender of Last Resort facility effectively allows banks to save
upon the spread between long-term and short-term interest rates when ﬁnancing their
activities. This borrowing cost advantage invalidates the assumption by Modigliani
and Miller (1958) that ﬁrms borrow against the same interest rate as their sharehold-
ers. As a result, banks can create shareholder value by levering their balance sheets,
i.e. by using more debt and less equity to ﬁnance their activities, as they can do this at
a lower cost than their shareholders can lever their own portfolios. In addition, banksIntroduction 5
obtain an incentive to diversify, as this reduces the risk on banks’ assets so that for
any preferred level of default risk banks can increase their leverage further. Finally,
competitive pressures cause banks to translate their lower borrowing costs into lower
lending standards, which can lead them to ﬁnance investment projects of negative net
present value and thereby inﬂate a credit bubble.
Chapter 2 shows that because of the liquidity insurance by the Lender of Last Re-
sort, banks not only have an incentive to engage in excessive maturity transforma-
tion, but also to lever and diversify their balance sheets, and to lower their lending
standards. This incentive causes banks’ ﬁnancing structures to become highly similar,
with little equity and large amounts of short-term debt. In addition, diversiﬁcation
causes idiosyncratic risks in banks’ asset portfolios to cancel out so that these portfo-
lios become more correlated with the market portfolio, and therefore with each other
(see also Allen and Jagtiani 2000, Wagner 2010a). Under such circumstances, banks
are highly exposed to the same type of risks, and are thus likely to fail simultaneously.
This vulnerability to common shocks provides a potentially important explanation for
banks becoming unstable jointly.
Chapter 3 discusses the need to control for common shocks stemming from ﬂuc-
tuations in the currency of denomination when analysing contagion empirically. To
this end, the chapter ﬁrst summarises the main deﬁnitions of contagion adopted in the
empirical literature, and then focuses on the analysis of stock market contagion. This
strand of research can be seen as a branch from the early literature on diversiﬁcation
opportunities between international stock markets, e.g. Grubel (1968), with the con-
tagion literature focusing on whether such opportunities still exist during crisis times.
To examine this question, researchers generally analyse co-movements between stock
market returns, but in many cases ﬁrst convert these returns into US dollars. Doing so
wasappropriateintheearlyliteratureonstockmarketdiversiﬁcation, asexchangerate
risk was difﬁcult to hedge at the time so that focusing on US dollar returns was nec-
essary to adopt the perspective of a US investor. Chapter 3 however shows that when
analysing contagion, converting returns into a common currency can lead to biased
results. By focusing on returns expressed in US dollars instead of in local currencies,
ﬂuctuations in the US dollar exchange rate effectively have the same impact as a com-
mon shock on the stock market returns under analysis, which leads to overestimation6 Chapter 1
of contagion effects.
Chapter 4 empirically analyses contagion between ﬁnancial markets by focusing
on international stock market behaviour during the 1997 East Asian crisis and the 2007
Global Financial Crisis. A common approach to measure stock market contagion is
to compare correlation between markets during ‘tranquil’ and ‘crisis’ periods, and in-
vestigate whether during the crisis period correlation is signiﬁcantly elevated. This
approach requires the researcher to correct any changes in the correlation for changes
in the intensity of common shocks affecting the markets under scrutiny. Corsetti, Peri-
coli, and Sbracia (2005) show that as these shocks are unobserved, the outcomes of the
analysis become crucially dependent on rather arbitrary assumptions regarding the
behaviour of these shocks over time. Chapter 4 points out an additional cause for un-
certainty associated with this type of analysis, namely the assumptions regarding the
identiﬁcation of the ‘tranquil’ and ‘crisis’ sample. The chapter analyses this issue by
introducing a ﬂexible measure of stock market synchronicity, which can be calculated
for periods as short as a single trading day.
Identifying a ’crisis’ sample boils down to selecting the combination of stock mar-
kets and trading days for which contagion is to be analysed. This choice is generally
made ad hoc, with researchers ﬁrst selecting a source market where any contagion ef-
fects are believed to have originated, and then examining contagion between this mar-
ket and several other stock markets in the region. Also the trading days to be focused
on are generally chosen on an ad-hoc basis. Broadly speaking two approaches exist:
Forbes and Rigobon (2002) analyse a crisis period, using a ﬁxed time-frame after a crit-
ical event such as the collapse of the Hong Kong stock market in 1997. Bae, Karolyi,
and Stulz (2003) deﬁne a crisis quantile, focusing on a set of returns which are consid-
ered ’extreme’ (e.g. those returns in the 5-percent lower tail of the distribution). We
examine the robustness of both procedures by varying the choice of the ‘crisis’ sample
through combining all possible source countries with all possible crisis periods or cri-
sis quantiles. The analysis reveals that there are many arbitrary sub-samples for which
synchronicity between stock markets is signiﬁcantly higher than its full-sample value,
suggesting that any increases in synchronicity during crisis times cannot necessarily
be interpreted as evidence for contagion.Introduction 7
Chapter 5 analyses contagion between banks during the 2007 Global Financial Cri-
sis. FearofcontagionwasthemainmotivefortheUSgovernmenttorescueinvestment
bank Bear Stearns and insurance company AIG, since the ﬁnancial sector instability
that could be triggered by these companies’ bankruptcy was believed to be particu-
larly large (see Bernanke 2008, Federal Reserve Board 2008). The failure of a bank can
have a contagious impact on other banks through multiple channels, for instance by
causing losses on bilateral exposures, by inducing write downs due to ﬁre sales which
depress market prices, or by triggering a loss of conﬁdence amongst bank ﬁnanciers.
Even without the presence of unobserved common shocks these channels are hard to
disentangle empirically.
To measure contagion between banks, Chapter 5 uses an identiﬁcation strategy
based on the presumption that if ﬁnancial markets expect a bank’s default to be con-
tagious for any of the reasons outlined above, an increase in this bank’s default prob-
ability should lead to a decline in other banks’ market valuations. We put this hy-
pothesis to the test by estimating a panel regression model where changes in banks’
market values are driven by both an unobserved market factor and by changes in other
banks’ default probabilities. Contagion is thus not measured as residual co-movement
between bank stock prices after controlling for common shocks, but is explicitly mod-
eled as the impact of a change in one bank’s default risk on another bank’s market
value. We estimate this model for a global sample of the one hundred largest banks
during the 2007–2009 period, and ﬁnd that banks’ market values are to a large extent
driven by common shocks as reﬂected by the market factor. The impact of changes in
other banks’ default probabilities is nearly negligible, also when we focus on conta-
gion from larger banks or between banks which are more interconnected. This result
suggests that the risk of contagion between banks is of minor importance compared to
other factors driving banks’ market values.
While the default of a single bank might induce little contagion effects after all, the
default of entire countries could have a much larger destabilising impact on the ﬁnan-
cial system. Therefore, Chapter 6 focuses on developments in 2010, when the ﬁnancial
problems of Greece became so severe that the euro countries agreed to provide bilat-
eral loans for a total amount of EUR 80 billion, with the International Monetary Fund
in addition ﬁnancing EUR 30 billion under a stand-by arrangement. European Central8 Chapter 1
Bank Vice-president Constˆ ancio (2011) explains that fear of contagion was an impor-
tant motivation to provide ﬁnancial support to Greece, despite the no-bailout clause in
the Maastricht Treaty. A restructuring of Greek debt could lead to a new banking cri-
sis in the EU as several banks, notably in France and Germany, had a high exposure to
Greece. In addition, a Greek default could spill over to other highly indebted countries
in the euro area. The turmoil around the Greek debt crisis can however also be due to
common shocks stemming from news about a potential bailout. As Cochrane (2010)
puts it: “We’re told that a Greek default will lead to ’contagion.’ The only thing an
investor learns about Portuguese, Spanish, and Italian ﬁnances from a Greek default is
whether the EU will or won’t bail them out too. Any ’contagion’ here is entirely self-
inﬂicted. If everyone knew there wouldn’t be bailouts there would be no contagion.”
To distinguish between contagion from a potential Greek default and the impact
of news about a potential Greek bailout, Chapter 6 uses an event study approach as
adopted by Aharony and Swary (1983). It identiﬁes the events as the trading days
in 2010 with the largest volatility in Greek government bond prices, and relates those
days to the ‘news’ that caused these ﬂuctuations. This approach circumvents a major
problem of event studies, namely how to identify the main event days during which
there is really an event that is not expected (and therefore already priced in). We relate
the event dates either to news about Greek public ﬁnances or to news about the will-
ingness of European countries to provide ﬁnancial support to Greece. Using data for
48 European banks, we ﬁnd that only news about the Greek bailout has a signiﬁcant
effect on bank stock prices, while news about Greek public ﬁnances does not have such
an impact. Apparently, investors expect contagion from a potential Greek default to
be small. However, we also ﬁnd that the price of sovereign debt of Portugal, Ireland,
and Spain responds to news about Greece’s bailout as well as to news about Greece’s
public ﬁnances. This last ﬁnding could be interpreted as evidence for contagion, but is
likely to be due to the so-called ‘wake-up call’ effect, where learning from news about
a crisis country prompts investors to reassess the vulnerability of other countries as
well.Chapter 2
Common Shocks in the Banking
Sector
*This chapter is based on Mink (2011).10 Chapter 2
2.1 Introduction
When different banks engage in the same types of risk-taking they become more sen-
sitive to adverse shocks common to the sector as a whole, which can put at risk the
stability of the ﬁnancial system. The main types of risk-taking that are widely shared
amongst banks are maturity transformation, leverage, diversiﬁcation, and lending
standard deterioration. By engaging in maturity transformation, banks ﬁnance long-
term assets with short-term debt, which makes them prone to bank runs and sudden
illiquidity.1 By levering their balance sheets, banks use less equity to ﬁnance their as-
sets, so that a small decline in asset value can cause them to become insolvent. Portfo-
lio diversiﬁcation in turn reduces banks’ exposure to idiosyncratic risks, but increases
their exposure to systematic risks so that they are more likely to become insolvent si-
multaneously.2 Finally, by lowering their lending standards, banks can inﬂate a credit
bubble, the bursting of which could trigger a ﬁnancial crisis. Brunnermeier (2009) and
Hellwig (2009) describe how this bank risk-taking intensiﬁed during the run-up to the
2007 ﬁnancial crisis.
The 2007 ﬁnancial crisis illustrates how the above four types of risk-taking are par-
ticularly prevalent in the banking sector, especially when contrasted with corporate
risk-taking in sectors of the real economy. This chapter shows that at least to some
extent, this risk-taking can be traced to a single institutional arrangement speciﬁc to
the banking sector: the provision of illiquidity insurance by the Lender of Last Re-
sort. We develop the mechanism through which the Lender of Last Resort affects bank
risk-taking within a stripped-down modeling framework, abstracting from incomplete
markets and asymmetric information that in more fully ﬂedged models justify the role
of banks as liquidity insurers and delegated monitors (see for instance Diamond and
Dybvig 1983, Calomiris and Kahn 1991). An obvious limitation of this stylised ap-
proach is that we do not take into account the many additional incentives for banks
to increase (or manage) their risk-taking, on which there is an extensive literature.3
1See for instance Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and Chen (1999).
2See for instance Allen and Jagtiani (2000), and Wagner (2008, 2010).
3Calomiris and Kahn (1991) and Diamond and Rajan (2001) explain that maturity transformation serves to
discipline bank managers by increasing the risk of a bank-run. Furlong and Keeley (1987) explain banks’
high leverage from the existence of retail deposit insurance, which for too-big-to-fail banks implicitly ex-
tends to wholesale creditors as well. Bank-speciﬁc diversiﬁcation incentives are not typically discussed in
the literature, but Penati and Protopapadakis (1988) argue that retail deposit insurance gives banks an incen-Bank Common Shocks 11
Of course, on itself this does not invalidate the mechanism we highlight in our main
analysis, which we believe can easily be incorporated in more fully ﬂedged banking
models.
The need for a Lender of Last Resort in managing ﬁnancial crises has been widely
acknowledged amongst both policy makers and academics, see for instance the review
by Freixas, Giannini, Hoggarth, and Soussa (2000) and the references therein. In line
with general insights from insurance economics, however, the provision of liquidity
support causes moral hazard, with banks being stimulated to increase their liquidity
risk-taking via maturity transformation.4 Still, the consensus in the literature has been
that “where liquidity support clearly can be separated from the provision of risk cap-
ital, the moral hazard created will be limited to possible mismanagement of liquidity
risk” (Freixas, Giannini, Hoggarth and Soussa, 2000, p.73). This conclusion is con-
ﬁrmed by Repullo (2005), who shows that the Lender of Last Resort causes banks to
increase illiquidity risk-taking while leaving the riskiness of their asset portfolio un-
changed. If the Lender of Last Resort however reduces incentives for ﬁnanciers to
charge higher interest rates when banks are riskier, Repullo (2005) shows that banks
choose riskier assets as well. In recent work by Farhi and Tirole (2012), banks can
only increase maturity transformation via replacing equity by short-term debt, so that
by stimulating maturity transformation, the Lender of Last Resort induces banks to
increase their leverage as well.
We contribute to this literature by recognising that through facilitating bank matu-
rity transformation, the Lender of Last Resort allows banks to borrow against short-
term rather than long-term interest rates when ﬁnancing their activities. Shareholders
of banks do not have this advantage, as borrowing short-term to ﬁnance their invest-
tive to increase asset return correlation with each other deliberately, while Acharya and Yorulmazer (2007)
and Farhi and Tirole (2012) attribute this incentive to implicit too-many-to-fail guarantees. Lending stan-
dard deterioration can be explained from short-sightedness or deteriorating ability of bank loan ofﬁcers, see
Rajan (1994) and Berger and Udell (2004).
4Liquidity support can be substantial especially when multiple banks are illiquid at the same time. During
the current crisis for instance, central banks provided not only emergency liquidity support to individual
banks, but also massively increased the supply of liquidity to the banking sector as a whole. ECB President
Trichet (2009) explains that “the Eurosystem’s open market operations have, in addition to steering short-
term interest rates, also sought to ensure that solvent banks have continued access to liquidity. [...] We
are now providing — and this is quite exceptional — unlimited reﬁnancing to the banks of the euro area
for maturities ranging from one week to six months in exchange for eligible collateral. [...] In total, the
Eurosystem’s balance sheet rose by about EUR 600 billion since end-June 2007 and today, an increase of
about 65%.”12 Chapter 2
ment portfolio one-on-one increases their illiquidity risk. As a result, banks can effec-
tively borrow at a lower cost than their shareholders, so that bank leverage increases
shareholder value. Bank diversiﬁcation increases shareholder value by reducing the
risk on banks’ assets, so that for any target level of default risk banks can increase their
leverage further. Competition between banks makes them translate their lower bor-
rowing costs into lower lending standards, thereby ﬁnancing investment projects of
negative net present value.
Inanextensiontothemodel, weshowthatregulatoryliquidityrequirementsaimed
at limiting maturity transformation reduce all forms of bank risk-taking examined.
Regulatory capital requirements are effective in reducing leverage and lending stan-
dard deterioration, but do not affect maturity transformation and diversiﬁcation. In
fact, if there are costs involved in diversifying into a new asset category, regulatory
capitalrequirementsincreasediversiﬁcationincentivesbyreducingtheimpactofthese
costs on banks’ return on equity. Designing an optimal capital requirement then in-
volves trading off the stability of individual banks against the stability of the banking
sector as a whole. International capital requirements were already in place long be-
fore the outbreak of the 2007 Global Financial Crisis, while liquidity requirements will
be incorporated in international banking regulation by 2018 (see Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision 2010). Banks have opposed stricter capital and liquidity require-
ments by arguing that equity and long-term debt are both ‘expensive’ sources of fund-
ing. In our analysis this is also the case, but only because these funding sources do not
allow banks to beneﬁt from the illiquidity insurance by the Lender of Last Resort. As
a result, as argued by Admati, DeMarzo, Hellwig, and Pﬂeiderer (2010), equity and
long-term debt are not expensive from the perspective of society as a whole.5
Our model has two implications for further research. First, it suggests micro-
economic bank risk-taking can be connected to the stance of the macro-economy via
the difference between long-term and short-term interest rates. This term spread is a
leading indicator of the business cycle (see also Ang, Piazzesi and Wei 2006 and the ref-
erences therein), used for instance in the Conference Board’s Leading Economic Index.
Both bank proﬁtability and bank risk-taking increase when the term spread steepens,
5See Van den Heuvel (2008) for a discussion of the welfare cost of bank capital requirements in a general
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since engaging in maturity transformation then provides banks with a larger borrow-
ing cost advantage. To the best of our knowledge this mechanism of procyclical bank
risk-taking has not been established in the literature before. Bank risk-taking in turn
could feed back into the term spread if maturity transformation and lending standard
deterioration affect the (relative) price of long-term and short-term funds in the econ-
omy. Exploring both effects could shed further light on the interactions between the
banking sector and the real economy, but is beyond the scope of the present chapter.
Second, our analysis suggests a relationship between bank risk-taking and mone-
tary policy. First, lower policy rates translate into lower short-term interest rates and
thus steepen the term spread directly. Second, when policy rates are low for a longer
time, rising inﬂation expectations might drive up long-term interest rates and steepen
the term spread further.6 This relationship adds a new component to the ‘risk-taking
channel’ of monetary policy discussed by Borio and Zhu (2008). Angeloni, Faia, and
Lo Duca (2010) provide empirical evidence for the U.S. that lower policy rates increase
bank leverage. Ioannidou, Ongena, and Peydr´ o (2009), Jim´ enez, Ongena, Peydr´ o, and
Saurina (2010) and Maddaloni, Peydr´ o, and Scopel (2010) document that lower policy
rates weaken bank lending standards. The last authors also show that prolonging low
policy rates weakens lending standards even further. These effects are suggested by
our model as well.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 introduces a
stylised model of bank risk-taking. Section 2.3 augments this model by introducing
a Lender of Last Resort. Section 2.4 extends the model by analysing the effects of
regulatory capital and liquidity requirements and by allowing for diversiﬁcation costs.
The ﬁnal section concludes.
2.2 Risk-taking without illiquidity insurance
To facilitate interpreting the mechanism that drives banks to lever, diversify, and lower
their lending standards, we use a simple model consisting of three components.
6Ellingsen and S¨ oderstr¨ om (2001) show that the impact of monetary policy on long-term interest rates is
not unambiguous.14 Chapter 2
Lending projects. There are two long-term bank lending projects. Both projects are
identical in the sense that for long-term risk-free interest rate r > 0, they yield returns
with mean (1+ p)r and standard deviation s (we omit project-speciﬁc subscripts for
notational convenience). Banks charge the premium p > 0 as a compensation for the
credit risk on their lending projects, so that (1+ p)r equals the cost effective interest
rate given the riskiness of the projects. The two projects only differ in the sense that
the correlation r between their returns is strictly smaller than 1, which provides banks
with the opportunity to diversify.
Banks. There are two banks that both ﬁnance their assets A with debt D and equity E,
so that for each bank A = D + E with leverage L = A/E (we omit bank-speciﬁc sub-
scripts for notational convenience). The standard deviation of banks’ equity returns
is denoted by sE, with sE = sAA/E.7 Banks can specialise in one lending project,
or diversify by investing in both. When they diversify, the mean of the return on as-
sets remains equal to (1+ p)r, but the standard deviation thereof declines from s to
p
0.5(1+ r)s.8
Shareholder. The shareholder has an amount I to invest in the equity of one or both
banks, using borrowed funds B and own funds O so that I = B + O. In line with
the above, the standard deviation of the return on the shareholder’s own funds equals
sO = sII/O. The shareholder aims to maximise the return on his own funds given his
preferred level of portfolio risk sO.9
As a benchmark case we assume that banks and the shareholder borrow against
7This expression follows from taking into account that the risk on assets is proportionally born by debt
and equity holders according to s2
A =
q
(E/A)
2 s2
E + (D/A)
2 s2
D + 2(E/A)(D/A)Cov(sEsD). We set the
standard deviation of the return on debt sD equal to zero, which implies that the risk on assets is fully born
by banks’ equity holders. In practice this standard deviation is larger than zero since banks’ debt holders
suffer a loss if the bank would go bankrupt. During non-crisis times this effect is of little empirical impor-
tance, however, while taking it into account would complicate the model without qualitatively affecting its
conclusions.
8Spreading funds evenly over both projects implies sA =
p
0.52s2 + 0.52s2 + 2r0.52s2 =
p
0.5(1+ r)s.
9The shareholder will accept a higher level of portfolio risk if this leads to a sufﬁciently higher portfolio
return. We however assume the bank considers sO to be exogenous when it decides upon its actions, as in
practice these actions only marginally affect the overall return on the broad portfolio of ﬁnancial and non-
ﬁnancial assets owned by the shareholder. Moreover, allowing sO to increase in the return on own funds
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the risk-free interest rate r. The shareholder constructs a diversiﬁed portfolio as this
reduces risk while keeping returns unchanged. He can do so in two ways: either by
equally spreading his funds over two banks that each have specialised in a different
lending project, or by buying shares of one bank that has equally spread his funds
over both lending projects. The shareholder can also lever his portfolio in two ways.
He can either lever himself by using borrowed funds to buy the shares of unlevered
banks, or he can let the banks lever while using only his own funds to buy these banks’
shares. We thus distinguish four alternative scenarios based on whether the bank or
the shareholder levers and/or diversiﬁes.
We show in the Appendix that under all four scenarios the shareholder’s return on
own funds (ROO) is the same, and equal to
ROO =
 
1+
sO
s
1
p
0.5(1+ r)
p
!
r, (2.1)
which can be written as r + (A/O)pr. This return can be interpreted as the share-
holder’s minimum required return, being equal to the interest rate on risk-free debt
plus a cost effective reward required for the risk born on own funds (which increases
in the cost-effective premium p and the total leverage of the bank and the shareholder
A/O). As the shareholder’s return on own funds is the same under all four scenarios,
leverage and diversiﬁcation at the bank level do not increase shareholder value. The
reason is the same as in Modigliani and Miller (1958), being that the shareholder can
also lever and diversify his portfolio himself. If we had allowed for (small) bankruptcy
costs and economies of scale from banks lending to a single project, leverage and di-
versiﬁcation at the level of the bank actually reduce shareholder value. Shareholder
value also declines when banks lower their lending standards, which we show below
can be modeled as banks charging interest rates below the cost effective level (1+ p)r.
2.3 Risk-taking with illiquidity insurance
To analyse banks’ incentive to lever, diversify, and lower their lending standards, we
modify the set-up of the previous section by taking into account that banks obtain
illiquidity insurance from the Lender of Last Resort. The Lender of Last Resort pro-16 Chapter 2
vides solvent banks with short-term funds when they are in imminent need of liquid-
ity. Repullo (2005) models this insurance as central banks providing targeted loans to
individual banks once outﬂows of short-term funds exceed their liquid assets avail-
able. Farhi and Tirole (2012) focus on a broader type of insurance, which goes beyond
the traditional Lender of Last Resort deﬁnition, and have central banks lower mon-
etary policy interest rates once banks suffer from illiquidity. Both types of insurance
lead to moral hazard, which in the literature review by Freixas, Giannini, Hoggarth,
and Soussa (2000) is summarised as banks increasing their illiquidity risk-taking. In
the analysis by Repullo (2005), the higher illiquidity risk-taking manifests itself in the
form of banks fully ﬁnanced with short-term debt reducing their holdings of liquid
short-term assets. In Farhi and Tirole (2012), the moral hazard is reﬂected by banks
fully invested in illiquid long-term assets relying too much on short-term debt to ﬁ-
nance their activities. As bank liquidity is a net concept relating available liquid assets
to cash outﬂows, both effects are two sides of the same coin.
Financinglong-termassetsviarolling-overshort-termdebt, insteadofissuinglong-
term debt, is generally referred to as maturity transformation. Also ﬁrms who do not
beneﬁt from a Lender of Last Resort can engage in maturity transformation, which has
two opposite effects on their ﬁnancing costs. First, ﬁnancing costs decline as short-
term risk-free interest rates are usually lower than long-term risk-free interest rates.
Second, ﬁnancing costs increase as debt holders charge (higher) credit risk premia on
top of the risk-free interest rate and shareholders raise their required returns. This
way, both equity and debt holders demand compensation for the risk that a sudden
outﬂow of short-term funds could force the ﬁrm to prematurely liquidate assets, with
insolvency as the potential outcome.
When modeling the impact of maturity transformation on bank ﬁnancing costs,
we take into account the existence of a Lender of Last Resort by assuming the sec-
ond of the above two effects does not occur. This implies the Lender of Last Resort
fully insures banks against illiquidity risk against a zero cost. While being a some-
what crude summary of the extensive literature on the Lender of Last Resort, this as-
sumption greatly simpliﬁes the analysis as it allows us to abstain from modeling any
increases in credit risk premia on debt or in shareholders’ required returns.10 As a
10As risk premia on debt are an important mechanism through which bank ﬁnanciers exercise market dis-Bank Common Shocks 17
result, bank maturity transformation can be modeled simply by introducing a param-
eter t > 0, which indicates the amount of short-term debt as a fraction of total debt
issued by the bank. In addition to the long-term interest rate r, we also deﬁne a short-
term interest rate s, with the difference between both being equal to the term spread
r = r   s. The average interest rate that banks pay on their issued debt is then given
by (1  t)r + ts = r   tr.11 As tr > 0, this average interest rate is lower than the
long-term rate r, reﬂecting the ﬁrst effect above that increasing maturity transforma-
tion lowers bank ﬁnancing costs.
When banks engage in maturity transformation, both bank leverage and bank di-
versiﬁcation affect shareholder value. To show this we again compare shareholders’
return on own funds under the four scenarios discussed above. The scenarios where
the shareholder levers (LS) yield a shareholder return on own funds equal to
ROOLS,DS = ROOLS,DB =
 
1+
sO
s
1
p
0.5(1+ r)
p
!
r, (2.2)
which does not depend on whether the shareholder diversiﬁes (DS) or whether diver-
siﬁcation is done by the bank (DB). Both returns on own funds are identical to the one
in the previous section, since when the shareholder levers the ability of the bank to en-
gage in maturity transformation is not put to use and thus does not affect the return on
own funds. The returns on own funds change when the bank levers (LB) instead of the
shareholder. When the bank levers and the shareholder diversiﬁes, the shareholder’s
return on own funds equals
ROOLB,DS =
 
1+
sO
s
1
p
0.5(1+ r)
p
!
r +
sO
s
  1
 1
p
0.5(1+ r)
tr, (2.3)
cipline, abstaining from modeling them implies that our results do not do full justice to banks’ incentives to
adequately manage risks themselves.
11If we normalise the short-term interest rate s to equal zero, we have r = r so that the average interest
rate on bank debt becomes (1  t)r. This expression illustrates that in our framework the effect of maturity
transformation on bank ﬁnancing costs can be modeled in a way that is observationally equivalent to the
modeling of the corporate debt tax shield discussed by Modigliani and Miller (1958), where the parameter t
indicates the corporate income tax rate. The risk-taking mechanism in our model is therefore closely related
to the insights of Modigliani and Miller (1958) and Lewellen (1971) that the debt tax shield provides ﬁrms
with an incentive to increase leverage and diversiﬁcation.18 Chapter 2
while when instead the bank diversiﬁes this return becomes
ROOLB,DB =
 
1+
sO
s
1
p
0.5(1+ r)
p
!
r +
sO
s
  1
 1
p
0.5(1+ r)
tr
+
 
1
p
0.5(1+ r)
  1
!
tr. (2.4)
This last expression can be written as r + (A/O)pr + (A/O   1)tr, which is equal
to the risk-free long-term interest rate plus a reward required for the risk born on own
funds, and plus the additional proﬁts from engaging in maturity transformation t.
When t > 0, the last term of this expression is larger than zero, so that engaging in ma-
turity transformation increases shareholder value through raising the return on own
funds (while leaving required returns unchanged at r + (A/O)pr). The expression
for this return on own funds implies bank proﬁtability increases in the term spread r,
which is a well known empirical regularity. We discuss below what the composition
of this return on own funds implies for the impact of leverage, diversiﬁcation, and
lending standard deterioration on shareholder value.
2.3.1 Bank leverage and shareholder value
Comparing the returns on own funds in Equations (2.2) and (2.3) shows that the gain
for the shareholder from letting the bank lever instead of doing so himself can be writ-
ten as
ROOLS,DS   ROOLB,DS =
sO
s
  1
 1
p
0.5(1+ r)
tr. (2.5)
Since this gain is always positive when sO/s > 1, letting the bank borrow instead of
the shareholder always increases shareholder value. The intuition behind this result is
that because of its ability to roll-over short-term debt without running illiquidity risk,
the bank can effectively ﬁnance its assets against a lower interest rate than the share-
holder. The shareholder therefore receives a higher return on own funds when he lets
the bank borrow instead of doing so himself. Going from left to right in Equation (2.5),
the incentive for the bank to lever instead of the shareholder is stronger when:
Shareholders prefer more risk. When sO is higher, shareholders prefer a more risky in-Bank Common Shocks 19
vestment portfolio, and thus want to take a more leveraged exposure to the projects
that banksinvest in. This requiresa larger amountof debt tobe issued, whichincreases
the gain from letting the bank doing so and exploit its borrowing cost advantage.
Banks invest in safer projects. When s is lower, banks invest in less risky projects. For a
given level of shareholder risk preference this allows for a larger amount of debt to be
issued, which increases the gain from letting the bank doing so to exploit its borrowing
cost advantage.
Lending projects are less correlated. When the correlation r between lending projects
is lower, this leads to a smaller value of
p
0.5(1+ r). For a given level of riskiness
of these individual lending projects, the risk on the shareholder’s own funds is then
lower. Shareholders therefore need more leverage to align their portfolio’s risk with
their personal risk preferences, which increases the beneﬁts from letting the bank bor-
row instead of doing so themselves.
Bank maturity transformation is higher. When t is higher, banks ﬁnance themselves with
a larger proportion of short-term funds, which increases the borrowing cost advantage
they have over their shareholders. Shareholders are then more likely to prefer the bank
to lever rather than doing so themselves.
The term spread is steeper. When r is higher, the term spread is steeper so that the
difference between long-term and short-term interest rates is larger. The borrowing
cost advantage stemming from banks’ ability to engage in maturity transformation is
then larger, so that bank instead of shareholder leverage becomes more attractive.
2.3.2 Bank diversiﬁcation and shareholder value
If banks did not lever they also would not have an incentive to diversify, as follows
directly from Equation (2.2). Having established however that bank shareholders gain
from letting banks lever, banks obtain an incentive to diversify as well. The intuition
behind this result is that bank leverage L = A/E is related to the bank’s standard devi-20 Chapter 2
ation of equity according to LsA = sE, as was shown in Section 2.2. As a result, using
diversiﬁcation to reduce the risk on its lending portfolio allows the bank to increase
leverage without having to increase its default risk (which increases in sE). Compar-
ing Equations (2.3) and (2.4) shows that bank diversiﬁcation increases shareholders’
return on own funds by
ROOLB,DS   ROOLB,DB =
 
1
p
0.5(1+ r)
  1
!
tr, (2.6)
which is always larger than zero. Going from left to right in Equation (2.6), the share-
holder’sgainfromlettingthebankdiversifyinsteadofdoingsohimselfislargerwhen:
Lending projects are less correlated. When the correlation r between lending projects
is lower, the value of
p
0.5(1+ r) decreases. Diversifying between lending projects
then leads to a larger reduction in the risk on assets, and thus creates more room for
bank leverage to exploit the bank’s borrowing cost advantage.
Bank maturity transformation is higher. When t is higher, banks ﬁnance themselves with
a larger proportion of short-term funds, which increases their borrowing cost advan-
tage relative to their shareholders. Banks’ incentive to diversify then increases, as do-
ing so allows for more exploitation of this borrowing cost advantage.
The term spread is steeper. When r is higher, the term spread is steeper so that the
difference between long-term and short-term interest rates is larger. The borrowing
cost advantage stemming from banks’ ability to engage in maturity transformation is
then larger, so that bank instead of shareholder leverage becomes more attractive. In
turn, this increases the gain from bank diversiﬁcation as well.
2.3.3 Bank lending standard deterioration and shareholder value
Up to this point we have allowed the gains from bank maturity transformation to fully
accrue to the shareholder in the form of a higher return on his own funds. This is
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will also use these gains to lower the price of their loans. To allow for this effect we
model bank lending rates as (1+ p   d)r, where d > 0 is a discount offered by the
bank on the original cost effective loan rate. The corresponding return on own funds
when the bank levers and diversiﬁes is obtained by replacing p in Equation (2.4) by
(p   d). Naturally, the bank can only offer a discount as long as the shareholder’s
return on own funds at least remains equal to his required return reported in Equation
(2.2). As a result, the discount that the bank can offer is constrained by
d <

1 
s
sO
q
0.5(1+ r)

t

1 
s
r

, (2.7)
which can be written as d <
 
1  1/LLB,DB
t (r/r).12 The right hand side of this
condition is larger than zero, indicating that by engaging in maturity transformation,
the bank can offer a non-zero discount on the original lending rate. Going from left to
right in Equation (2.7), this discount increases when:
Shareholders prefer more risk. When sO is higher, shareholders prefer a more risky invest-
ment portfolio, and thus want to take a more leveraged exposure to the projects that
banks invest in. This allows banks to use more debt to ﬁnance their lending projects,
which increases the gains from maturity transformation and allows for lower bank
lending rates.
Banks invest in safer projects. When s is lower, banks invest in less risky projects. They
can then use more leverage to ﬁnance these projects, and thus obtain a larger gain from
their ability to engage in maturity transformation. As a result, they can give a larger
discount on their lending rates.
Lending projects are less correlated. When the correlation r between lending projects
is lower, the value of
p
0.5(1+ r) decreases. Diversifying between lending projects
then leads to a larger reduction in the risk on assets. This again allows for more lever-
age and a larger gain from maturity transformation, so that bank lending rates can be
12This result follows from noticing that when the bank levers and the shareholder does not, sO = sE so that
sO/
p
0.5(1+ r)s = LLB,DB.22 Chapter 2
lower.
Bank maturity transformation is higher. When t is higher, banks ﬁnance themselves with
a larger proportion of short-term funds, which lowers their borrowing costs so that
lending rates can be lower as well.
The term spread is steeper. When s/r is smaller, short-term interest rates are lower and
the difference between long-term and short-term interest rates is larger, so that the
term spread is steeper. The borrowing cost advantage stemming from banks’ ability to
engage in maturity transformation is then larger, so that it can offer a larger discount
on its lending rates.
By offering a discount, banks charge lending rates below the cost effective level
(1+ p)r. Equation (2.7) even implies that if maturity transformation and leverage are
high enough, the discount d can be larger than the risk-premium p. Banks then lend
against rates below the risk-free level r. As any non-zero discount d implies that banks
ﬁnance lending projects of negative net present value, offering such a discount implies
that lending standards deteriorate.13 This deterioration in lending standards can also
be illustrated by realising that, instead of charging lower lending rates for the original
lending projects, banks can use the additional proﬁts from maturity transformation to
ﬁnance riskier lending projects against the original interest rates (1+ p)r. Both cases
are two sides of the same coin, and imply an expansion of credit supply into assets that
are too risky for the returns they generate.
13The result that the projects’ NPV is negative follows from noticing that the bank invests an amount A in
a project that yields a return of (1+ p   d)r, while given the project’s riskiness the return required equals
(1+ p)r. The net present value of the project is then equal to   A
1 + A
1+(1+p)r +
(1+p d)rA
1+(1+p)r =   d
1+p+1/r,
which is smaller then zero.Bank Common Shocks 23
2.4 Extensions
2.4.1 Regulatory capital and liquidity requirements
To reduce bank risk-taking, bank regulators impose capital buffer requirements. In
particular, regulators limit the ratio of banks’ risk-weighted assets over their equity
buffers. In our model this ratio is equal to sAA/E = sE, so that capital requirements
can be modeled as regulators imposing an upper limit ¯ sE < sO on the standard devia-
tion of banks’ equity. As a result bank leverage declines from sO/s to ¯ sE/s. Replacing
sO inEquation(2.5)by ¯ sE showsthatregulatorycapitalrequirementslimitshareholder
gains from bank leverage, while doing the same in Equation (2.7) shows that they limit
lending standard deterioration as well. Bank capital requirements however do not
limit the incentive to diversify, since sO does not enter Equation (2.6). The intuition
behind this result is that the percentage decline in the capital requirement that can be
achieved through diversiﬁcation is independent of the size of this requirement itself.
In addition to imposing capital buffer requirements, the international banking reg-
ulation reforms set in motion since the 2007 Global Financial Crisis allow regulators to
impose bank liquidity buffer requirements as well (see Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision 2010). These requirements work to limit the maturity mismatch between
banks’ assets and liabilities, and can be modeled as regulators imposing an upper limit
¯ t on the amount of bank maturity transformation. Replacing t by ¯ t in Equations (2.5)–
(2.7) shows that such a limit would also reduce the gains from leverage and diversiﬁ-
cation, and would in addition reduce banks’ ability to offer a discount on their lending
rates.
In addition to reducing bank risk-taking, capital and liquidity requirements lead
bank proﬁts to be lower and cause bank loans to become more expensive. After all,
in the extreme case where ¯ sE = sA and/or ¯ t = 0, banks cannot afford to offer a
discount on their lending rates anymore, while to the extent that they used to pass
on the gains from maturity transformation to their shareholders, proﬁts will be lower
as well. These effects are counterbalanced by a decline in the illiquidity insurance
provided by the Lender of Last Resort. As a result, banks will consider equity and
long-term debt to be expensive sources of funding, but both are not expensive funding24 Chapter 2
sourcesfromtheperspectiveofsocietyasawhole(seealsoAdmati, DeMarzo, Hellwig,
and Pﬂeiderer 2010).
2.4.2 Diversiﬁcation costs
The previous analysis assumes that banks can diversify at a zero cost. In practice,
however, there are expenses involved when banks decide to invest part of their assets
in an additional project, for instance because they have to set up an ofﬁce network
in another geographical region or need to acquire knowledge about a new product
market. We model these expenses as banks having to pay a ﬁxed cost C in addition
to their interest expenses when they choose to diversify. In this case, the gain from
diversiﬁcation in Equation (2.6) must be augmented by a term  C/O. When there is a
regulatory capital requirement, this gain can be written as
ROOLB,DS   ROOLB,DB =
 
1
p
0.5(1+ r)
  1
!
tr  
C
A
¯ LLB,DB, (2.8)
with ¯ L denoting the leverage limit implied by the capital requirement ¯ sE.
The last term in the above expression has three implications. First, diversiﬁcation
obviously becomes more attractive when the diversiﬁcation cost C declines. Such a de-
cline could be due to ongoing ﬁnancial innovation making more risks tradeable, with
for instance the ability to buy securitised assets having allowed banks from all over the
world to issue U.S. mortgage loans without having to establish a local ofﬁce network.
Second, diversiﬁcation becomes more attractive when bank size A is larger, since this
reduces a bank’s relative burden of paying the ﬁxed cost C. Large banks are thus more
likely to diversify, in line with the intuition that large banks tend to be globally diver-
siﬁed while small banks tend to focus on local niche markets. Finally, diversiﬁcation
becomes more attractive when capital requirements ¯ L are stricter, as the cost C is then
smaller relative to banks’ equity buffers and thus has a smaller impact on their return
on equity. While micro-prudential capital requirements reduce the probability that an
individual bank defaults, through stimulating diversiﬁcation they can thus increase
the probability that such a default coincides with those of the other bank(s). Design-
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banks against the stability of the banking sector as a whole.14
2.5 Conclusion
Excessive bank maturity transformation, leverage, diversiﬁcation, and lending stan-
dard deterioration can put the stability of the ﬁnancial system at risk. This effect was
illustrated by the outbreak of the 2007 Global Financial Crisis, which has drawn re-
newed attention to the question of why especially banks engage in these forms of
risk-taking. We analyse this question by outlining a mechanism in which providing
banks with illiquidity insurance through a Lender of Last Resort is sufﬁcient to give
them an incentive to engage in maturity transformation, leverage, diversiﬁcation, and
lending standard deterioration. Naturally, when all banks engage in these same forms
of risk-taking, this makes them more sensitive to adverse common shocks.
In our model, the moral hazard from Lender of Last Resort interventions can effec-
tively be reduced via regulatory bank liquidity requirements. Regulatory capital re-
quirements reduce the probability of individual bank defaults, but can stimulate bank
diversiﬁcation and thereby increase the probability that such defaults occur simulta-
neously. While banks consider equity and long-term debt to be expensive sources
of funding, in our model both are not expensive from the perspective of society as a
whole.
The model connects both micro-economic bank proﬁtability and risk-taking to the
overall stance of the macro-economy via the term spread, which is a well-known indi-
catorofthebusinesscycle. Bankrisk-takingissuggestedtobeprocyclicalasitbecomes
more proﬁtable when the term spread steepens. The analysis also suggests a new risk-
taking channel of monetary policy, as lower policy rates can steepen the term spread
and thereby increase bank risk-taking. Although we have adopted a stylised modeling
framework to establish our results, analysing these mechanisms in more detail within
the context of a general equilibrium model is a fruitful area for future research.
14Zhou (2010) arrives at the same conclusion, although his risk-taking mechanism differs from the one
outlined above.26 Chapter 2
2.A Appendix
If the shareholder levers (LS) instead of the bank, the bank’s equity is by deﬁnition
equal to the bank’s assets. In the scenario where the shareholder diversiﬁes (DS) and
chooses the bank to specialise, this implies that ELS,DS = A. The bank’s return on
equity (ROE) then equals the income from investing in a single project divided by
total shareholder equity:
ROELS,DS =
(1+ p)rA
ELS,DS
=
A
A
(1+ p)r
= pr + r.
The shareholder now equally spreads his funds over the shares of two specialised
banks. His return on own funds (ROO) then equals the return on the investment in
both banks’ equity minus his interest expenditure on borrowed funds, divided by his
amount of own funds:
ROOLS,DS =
ROELS,DSILS,DS   r
 
ILS,DS  O

O
=
ILS,DS
O

ROELS,DS   r

+ r
=
sO
s
1
p
0.5(1+ r)
pr + r,
where for the last step we use ILS,DS/O = sO/s
LS,DS
I = sO/
p
0.5(1+ r)s. This re-
sult follows from the fact that as the bank does not lever, the standard deviation of
his equity is equal to the standard deviation of his assets. Hence, when the share-
holder spreads his investment equally over both banks’ equity, the standard deviation
of the resulting investment portfolio equals s
LS,DS
I =
p
0.52s2 + 0.52s2 + 2r0.52s2 =
p
0.5(1+ r)s.
In the scenario where the shareholder levers and the bank diversiﬁes (DB) by in-
vesting in both projects, the bank’s return on equity equals
ROELS,DB =
(1+ p)rA
ELS,DBBank Common Shocks 27
=
A
A
(1+ p)r
= pr + r.
The shareholder now invests all his funds in the diversiﬁed bank’s equity, in which
case he earns a return on own funds equal to
ROOLS,DB =
ROELS,DBILS,DB   r
 
ILS,DB  O

O
=
ILS,DB
O

ROELS,DB   r

+ r
=
sO
s
1
p
0.5(1+ r)
pr + r,
where for the last step we use ILS,DB/O = sO/s
LS,DB
I = sO/
p
0.5(1+ r)s.
Instead of levering his investment portfolio himself, the shareholder can also let
the bank lever (LB). The shareholder then does not borrow himself, but only uses his
own funds to buy banks’ equity. As a result, the amount of shareholder own funds is
by deﬁnition equal to the amount of shareholder investments. In the scenario where
the shareholder diversiﬁes and lets the bank specialise in a single lending project, this
implies that O = ILB,DS in which case the bank’s return on equity equals
ROELB,DS =
(1+ p)rA   r
 
A   ELB,DS
ELB,DS
=
A
ELB,DSpr + r
=
sO
s
1
p
0.5(1+ r)
pr + r,
where in the last step we use A/ELB,DS = s
LB,DS
E /s = sO/
p
0.5(1+ r)s. This result
follows from the fact that when the shareholder does not lever, the standard deviation
of his own funds equals the standard deviation of his investment portfolio, so that
sO = s
LB,DS
I =
p
0.5(1+ r)s
LB,DS
E . When the shareholder now spreads his funds over
two specialised banks, his return on own funds equals
ROOLB,DS =
ROELB,DSILB,DS
O28 Chapter 2
=
O
O
ROELB,DS
=
sO
s
1
p
0.5(1+ r)
pr + r.
Finally, in the last scenario the bank both levers and diversiﬁes instead of the share-
holder, so that its return on equity equals
ROELB,DB =
(1+ p)rA   r
 
A   ELB,DB
ELB,DB
=
A
ELB,DBpr + r
=
sO
s
1
p
0.5(1+ r)
pr + r,
where in the last step we use A/ELB,DS = s
LB,DS
E /s = sO/
p
0.5(1+ r)s. The return
on own funds for the shareholder who invests in the levered diversiﬁed bank then
equals
ROOLB,DB =
ROELB,DBILB,DB
O
=
O
O
ROELB,DB
=
sO
s
1
p
0.5(1+ r)
pr + r.Chapter 3
Common Shocks in Common
Currency Returns
*This chapter is based on Mink (2009).30 Chapter 3
3.1 Introduction
While there exist various deﬁnitions of ﬁnancial contagion, which we discuss below,
empirical research generally focuses on the co-movement between contemporaneous
market returns, for instance using a measure of correlation between them. As a ﬁrst
step in analysing these similarities, the original local currency returns are often con-
verted into a common currency, for which usually the US dollar is chosen. The moti-
vation for this choice, if any is provided, is generally that converting returns into US
dollars is consistent with ‘the perspective of an international investor’. This chapter
showsthatsuchconversionisatoddswiththeliteratureoncontagiousshocktransmis-
sion, and can bias empirical ﬁndings when for instance analysing the Global Financial
Crisis of 2007–2010. The reason for this bias is that when analysing returns expressed
in a common currency, ﬂuctuations in this currency’s exchange rate effectively act as a
common shock driving the observed stock market returns. These exchange rate ﬂuctu-
ations can then create the impression of stock market contagion when in reality there
is none.
The remainder of this Chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 summarises the
main deﬁnitions of contagion adopted in the empirical literature. Section 3.3 discusses
why this literature focuses on market returns converted to a common currency, and
explains why local currency returns are better used instead. Section 3.4 empirically
illustrates the bias that arises when focusing on US dollar returns. The ﬁnal section
concludes.
3.2 Deﬁning contagion
The empirical literature uses various deﬁnitions of ﬁnancial contagion, see for instance
the overviews by Rigobon (2002) and Pericoli and Sbracia (2003). Still, most commonly
used deﬁnitions of ﬁnancial contagion can be traced to a few inﬂuential papers, and, as
Dungey, Fry, Gonzales-Hermosillo, and Martin (2005) show, share several similarities.
Below, we discuss the most inﬂuential deﬁnitions, which mainly differ with respect to
when contagion is believed to potentially take place: always, or only during a ﬁnancial
crisis?Common Currency Returns 31
The seminal work by Forbes and Rigobon (2002) deﬁnes contagion between ﬁ-
nancial markets as a signiﬁcant increase in cross-market linkages after a shock to one
country. If there is no such signiﬁcant increase, but instead there are strong linkages
between the two economies that exist in all states of the world, the authors refer to this
as interdependence between markets. Contagion thus only occurs during a ﬁnancial
crisis, deﬁned as an adjacent time period (e.g. one month) after some exogenously
identiﬁed crisis event. This event can be the crash of a national stock market index, or,
as for instance in Chapter 4, the collapse of Lehman Brothers on 15 September 2008.
Bae, Karolyi, and Stulz (2003) analyse contagion by focusing on days with extreme
stock market returns, or so-called exceedance events. The authors deﬁne contagion
as the fraction of the exceedance events in a particular region that is left unexplained
by its own covariates but that is explained by the exceedances from another region.
When exceedances occur simultaneously across ﬁnancial markets, Bae, Karolyi, and
Stulz (2003) refer to this as a co-exceedance event. Parallel to the approach by Forbes
and Rigobon (2002), contagion thus only occurs during times of crises. These times
however do not comprise a certain period following a crisis event, but cover the set of
trading days during which returns exceed an exogenously identiﬁed threshold value.
Bae, Karolyi, and Stulz (2003) focus on the 5 percent most extreme returns in the dis-
tribution, while Chapter 4 examines contagion using other threshold values as well.
Bekaert, Harvey, and Ng (2005) use a contagion deﬁnition that differs from the
two above, because they argue that contagion between ﬁnancial markets implies that
there is correlation over and above what one would expect from economic fundamen-
tals. This deﬁnition allows contagion to occur during the full sample period rather
than being speciﬁcally associated with crisis times. At the same time, it requires the
researcher to explicitly formulate a model of fundamental transmission between mar-
kets. To this end, Bekaert, Harvey, and Ng (2005) adopt a CAPM-style factor model
with time varying beta coefﬁcients, and measure contagion as the correlation between
the model’s residuals.
Finally, Aharony and Swary (1983) focus on contagion between banks, which they
deﬁne as a domino-effect where regardless of the cause of bank failure, its effects spill
over to other banks, too. This deﬁnition implies contagion is associated with particular
crisis events, i.e. bank failures. The authors use an event study to examine the impact32 Chapter 3
of large bank defaults on other banks. Chapter 5 explains that anticipation by market
participants of such failure events can give rise to contagion also when the actual de-
fault eventually does not occur. Chapter 6 shows that the deﬁnition by Aharony and
Swary (1983) can be applied to contagion from sovereign defaults as well.
In their review of the literature, De Bandt and Hartmann (2002) summarise the
various deﬁnitions of contagion as the situation where the release of bad news about
a ﬁnancial institution, or even its failure, or the crash of a ﬁnancial market leads in
a sequential fashion to considerable adverse effects on one or several other ﬁnancial
institutions or markets. These adverse effects have to be such that the institutions af-
fected in the second round or later actually fail as a consequence of the initial shock,
although they have been fundamentally solvent ex ante, or that the market(s) affected
in later rounds also crash and would not have done so without the initial shock. Ac-
cording to this deﬁnition, contagion is associated with large adverse events and does
not occur during normal times.
A commonality shared by the above approaches is that contagion is measured as
a residual. That is, contagion is analysed by focusing on the residuals of a model of
‘fundamental’ asset returns, including any common shocks. These fundamentals can
be modeled either explicitly, as in Bekaert, Harvey, and Ng (2005), or implicitly as in
Forbes and Rigobon (2002). Consequently, as pointed out by Corsetti, Pericoli, and
Sbracia (2005), the results from the analysis are conditional upon how the researcher
chooses to model these fundamental factors. As many of these factors cannot be ob-
served directly, a popular approach is to resort to time series modeling techniques
and for instance specify the factors as GARCH processes (see Dungey, Fry, Gonzales-
Hermosillo, and Martin 2005). Chapter 5 adopts an alternative approach, and models
contagion as the coefﬁcient estimate obtained when regressing changes in one bank’s
market value on changes in another bank’s default risk.
Forthepurposeofthepresentthesisandtheanalysisbelow, themainmessagefrom
this overview is that all contagion deﬁnitions are consistent with the idea that conta-
gion is something different than a common shock. As explained in the ﬁrst chapter,
this distinction is relevant from both an academic and a policy perspective.Common Currency Returns 33
3.3 Common versus local currency returns
In many cases researchers measure contagion between markets after ﬁrst converting
the local currency returns into US dollars. The relationship between stock market re-
turns converted to US dollars and stock market returns expressed in local currencies
reads
R$
i,t = ln(Pi,t/Pi,t 1) + ln

E$
i,t/E$
i,t 1

, (3.1)
where Pi is the price index of country i’s stock market, and E$
i is the exchange rate
expressed as US dollars per domestic currency of country i. The stock market return
in US dollars, R$
i,t, can thus be decomposed in the local currency stock market return,
ln(Pi,t/Pi,t 1), and the change in the dollar exchange rate, ln

E$
i,t/E$
i,t 1

.
While local currency stock market returns and exchange rate ﬂuctuations can be
distinguished in theory, they were not always separable in practice. To appreciate this
point we have to go back to earlier work on diversiﬁcation between stock markets
by for instance Grubel (1968). At the time, exchange rate risk was difﬁcult to hedge
so that domestic investors could not invest in foreign stock markets without expos-
ing themselves to exchange rate ﬂuctuations. The potential gains from international
portfolio diversiﬁcation were therefore different for an American investor than for a
British investor, say, since both investors were exposed to ﬂuctuations in different ex-
change rates when converting their international portfolios’ returns into their domes-
tic currencies. When Grubel (1968) calculated the correlation between US and foreign
stock market returns, he therefore focused on returns in US dollars since he aimed “to
demonstrate the range ofpossible gains to Americaninvestors from international diver-
siﬁcation of their portfolios” (p. 1304, italics added). In a similar diversiﬁcation study
using US dollar returns, Levy and Sarnat (1970) note that this conversion implies that
“the optimal investment proportions set out in this paper are relevant ... for [investors
from] the United States, but not for [investors from] the United Kingdom” (p. 669).
As the literature on international portfolio diversiﬁcation evolved, a natural ex-
tension was to analyse whether the correlation between international stock markets
changed over time (see for instance Kaplanis, 1988). The October 1987 crash of the US
stock market and the simultaneous declines in other major stock markets caused the34 Chapter 3
literature to redirect focus to changes in correlation coefﬁcients during times of crisis,
fearing that in such times ‘all correlations tend to one’. This inspired the strand of
research that by now has become part of the empirical literature on contagion. Table
3.1 shows that most empirical contributions in this ﬁeld follow the original diversiﬁ-
cation literature in focusing (also) on US dollar returns, without providing much mo-
tivation for this choice. At best, authors brieﬂy refer to ‘common practice’ or to the
aforementioned ‘perspective of the international investor’. While converting returns
to a common currency was appropriate to analyse diversiﬁcation gains when exchange
rate risk was difﬁcult to hedge, such conversion is inappropriate when analysing con-
tagion between stock markets.
When analysing contagion between stock markets, adopting a particular investor
perspective by converting returns to a common currency is not a trivial issue. For
instance, what to do when one ﬁnds empirical evidence for contagion between market
returns converted to US dollars, but not for contagion between returns converted to
euros? Arguing that only returns in US dollars are relevant to international investors,
would be equally arbitrary as arguing that only returns in euros are important to them.
Alternatively, one could claim that US dollar investors are interested in the outcomes
based on US dollars, while euro investors are interested in the outcomes based on euro
returns. This interpretation, however, is inconsistent with the idea that whether or not
contagion occurred is not a matter of perspective. There either is or is not an investor
panic spilling over between stock markets, say; it cannot be the case that such a panic
occurs in the world of a US dollar investor, but not in the world of a euro investor.
Contagion is not in the eye of the beholder.
The crucial element to note is that contagion is about transmission of changes in
supply and demand across ﬁnancial markets. These changes in supply and demand
are most accurately reﬂected by market returns in local currencies, since only these
returns fully come about in national stock markets themselves. Equation (3.1) shows
that this property does not apply to returns converted to a common currency, since
these are not only driven by supply and demand in national stock markets, but also
by supply and demand in the market for foreign exchange. As a result, by converting
the returns on two stock markets into for instance US dollars, a sudden depreciation of
both local currencies against the dollar can create the impression of a synchronous fallCommon Currency Returns 35
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inthedemandforstocksacrossmarkets, evenwheninrealitythereisnone. Theimpact
of changes in the dollar exchange rate is then effectively equal to the impact of a com-
mon shock driving the examined market returns. This insight has been overlooked by
most previous research, even though it was already touched upon in a diversiﬁcation
study by Longin and Solnik (1995), who “use returns in local currency to focus on the
correlation across markets rather than across currencies” (p. 21).
3.4 Empirical comparison
We examine the difference between US dollar returns and local currency returns em-
pirically by focusing on the results from the regression
R$
i,t = ai + bRi,t + ei,t, (3.2)
which regresses US dollar returns of country i on a constant and this country’s local
currency returns. We also run this regression for squared market returns, as contagion
between the returns’ volatility could be of interest as well (see for instance Baele 2005).
Table 3.2 reports the b coefﬁcients from the regression equations, for all stock mar-
kets examined by Forbes and Rigobon (2002). We estimate these regressions for the
three years since the start of the Global Financial Crisis in mid-2007, which comprise
the period from Monday 2 July 2007 to Wednesday 30 June 2010. The ﬁrst column
reports the coefﬁcient estimates obtained when regressing each country’s US dollar
returns on the corresponding local currency returns. The more this coefﬁcient differs
from one, the larger the difference between both types of market returns. The reported
estimates vary between 0.87 and 1.40, with t statistics for the test whether these coefﬁ-
cients are equal to one varying between  7.35 and 12.92. The third and fourth columns
provide similar results for the regression using squared market returns, which are of
interest when analysing contagion in stock market volatility. For these squared re-
turns the coefﬁcient estimates vary between 0.75 and 2.71, with t statistics ranging
from  13.62 to 40.93. Differences between US dollar and local currency returns can
thus be substantial, and vary across countries in magnitude as well as in sign.
Figure 3.1 analyses whether differences between US dollar and local currency re-Common Currency Returns 37
Table 3.2. Similarity of local currency and US dollar returns
Regression equation: R$
i,t = ai + bRi,t + ei,t
Returns Squared returns
Region Country b t-stat.(b = 1) b t-stat.(b = 1)
East Asia Hong Kong 1.00 0.80 1.00 -1.49
Indonesia 1.15 6.25 1.31 12.56
Japan 0.87 -7.35 0.75 -13.62
Korea 1.37 6.81 2.71 31.19
Malaysia 1.17 9.96 1.22 13.10
Philippines 1.10 9.71 1.13 12.77
Singapore 1.08 8.12 1.15 15.45
Taiwan 1.07 9.34 1.17 21.31
Thailand 1.04 6.06 1.06 9.67
Latin Argentina 1.01 1.60 1.01 2.41
America Brazil 1.26 9.82 1.75 28.83
Chile 1.28 6.47 1.93 21.42
Mexico 1.22 8.33 1.62 23.29
OECD Australia 1.40 9.23 2.32 30.07
Belgium 1.12 7.07 1.28 16.27
Canada 1.17 6.79 1.41 16.73
France 1.13 9.07 1.37 24.90
Germany 1.13 8.61 1.30 19.01
Italy 1.17 8.53 1.32 16.30
Netherlands 1.12 7.94 1.34 21.86
Spain 1.13 9.74 1.32 23.39
Sweden 1.29 12.92 1.71 31.51
Switzerland 0.98 -0.90 0.97 -1.39
United Kingdom 1.17 8.26 1.51 24.70
Other China 1.00 0.69 1.00 -2.03
emerging India 1.13 12.42 1.29 28.37
markets Russia 1.08 8.12 1.08 7.96
South Africa 1.38 12.28 2.27 40.93
The examined sample period runs from 1 July 2007 to 30 June 2010. Returns are measured on a daily basis.
The stock market indices used are the Hang Seng, Jakarta SE Composite, Nikkei 225 Stock Average, Korea
SE Composite, KLCI Composite, Philippine SE I, MSCI Singapore, Taiwan SE Weighted, Bangkok SET, MSCI
Argentina, Brazil Bovespa, Chil General (IGPA), Mexico IPC (Bolsa), ASX all ordinaries, BEL-20, S&P/TSX
60, CAC-40, DAX 30, FTSE Italia MIB Storico, AEX, IBEX 35, OMX Stockholm, Swiss Market Price Index,
FTSE100, Shanghai SE Composite, India BSE 100, MSCI Russia, FTSE/JSE.38 Chapter 3
turns vary over time. The graphs report the sum of squared residuals from recursive
estimation of the regression in Equation (3.2), i.e. repeated estimation of the regres-
sions for ever larger subsets of the sample data, expressed as a percentage of the sum
of squared residuals for the full-sample period. If the regression coefﬁcient and model
ﬁt are constant over time, for gradually expanding sample sizes this ratio should in-
crease from 0 to 1 within the indicated ﬁve percent conﬁdence bounds. The graphs
show that this ratio often is outside these bounds, while Figure 3.2 ﬁnds the same re-
sult for regressions using squared stock market returns. This result implies that the
estimated b coefﬁcients are not constant across the full sample period. Hence, while
the ﬁnding from the table was that US dollar and local currency returns are different
on average, the graphs show that the difference between both also changes over time.
For illustrative purposes, we investigate to what extent focusing on US dollar re-
turns can bias results from the contagion test by Forbes and Rigobon (2002). These au-
thors calculate an adjusted (for heteroscedasticity) correlation statistic between pairs of
stock markets, and examine whether there is contagion between both markets by com-
paring the correlation between ‘crisis’ and ‘tranquil’ periods. As a large amount of
alternative testing procedures have been proposed since Forbes and Rigobon’s (2002)
seminal work, this exercise is not meant as a formal test of contagion, but is only in-
dicative of the bias that could arise when using US dollar returns to examine stock
market contagion. We apply the Forbes and Rigobon (2002) contagion test to local cur-
rency as well as US dollar returns, and examine to what extent the t statistics for the
increase in correlations between the tranquil and crisis period differ across currencies.
We calculate the adjusted correlation coefﬁcient between the United States’ market re-
turns and the returns of each country in Table 3.2, examining the one-month crisis
period following the collapse of Lehman Brothers on Monday 15 September 2008. We
focus on the adjusted correlation between the residuals of a VAR(5) model in which all
countries’ return series are simultaneously included.
The results show that when deﬁning the tranquil period as the full three-year pe-
riod after 2 July 2007, t statistics for US dollar returns are on average 0.25 points
higher than those for local currency returns, while the correlation between both sets of
t statistics equals 0.85. When deﬁning the tranquil period as year following Tuesday
1 July 2008, US dollar t statistics are as much as 0.67 points higher than the ones for lo-Common Currency Returns 39
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cal currency returns, whilst the correlation of US dollar with local currency t statistics
equals only 0.67. Using US dollar returns can thus bias the t statistics on average, as
well as bias countries’ ranking based on these statistics. Depending on the chosen sig-
niﬁcance level, i.e. the chosen critical values for the t statistics, this bias affects the
conclusions on when and between which countries contagion has occurred. To avoid
this bias from affecting the results of empirical contagion tests, we suggest to focus on
stock market returns expressed in local currencies.
3.5 Conclusion
Having summarised the main deﬁnitions of contagion in the empirical literature, this
chapter discusses the common practice to analyse stock market contagion by focus-
ing on market returns converted to US dollars. This practice originated in the early
literature on diversiﬁcation between international stock markets, but we show that
when analysing contagion such a conversion is inappropriate. The reason is that only
returns denominated in local currencies accurately reﬂect supply and demand in na-
tional stock markets. For the 2007–2010 Global Financial Crisis, the differences be-
tween both types of returns turn out to be large due to the volatility of the dollar
exchange rate, which is shown to bias the outcomes of a contagion test.Chapter 4
Contagion from Stock Market
Crises
*This chapter is based on Mierau and Mink (2009).44 Chapter 4
4.1 Introduction
The behaviour of international stock markets illustrates why investors fear that dur-
ing ﬁnancial crises contagion occurs: while in tranquil times returns across markets
correlate only mildly, the correlation between them tends to jump when sudden price
drops occur. (see Chapter 3 for an overview of contagion deﬁnitions adopted in the
literature).1 This chapter examines contagion between stock markets in more detail by
(i) introducing a measure of co-movement between stock markets that is new to the
contagion literature, and (ii) by analysing how conclusions about contagion depend
on the choice of the ‘crisis’ sample.
As our measure of co-movement we use the ﬂexible measure of stock market syn-
chronicity proposed by Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000), and examine contagion by com-
paring synchronicity between various crisis and non-crisis samples. Morck, Yeung,
and Yu (2000) use the measure to study synchronicity within a larger cross-section or
region of stock markets, while we show that it can also be applied to synchronicity be-
tweenasinglemarketandtheregionaswellastosynchronicitybetweenapairofstock
markets. In a two-market setting, for instance, the measure indicates whether or not
both markets move in the same direction, i.e. up or down. For our purpose, additional
advantages of the measure are that it can be applied to periods as short as a single
trading day, and that it does not require the market returns to be standardised (which
could give results that are difﬁcult to interpret when these returns are non-normal or
heteroscedastic).
In order to differentiate between tranquil times and times of crisis, it is adamant to
ﬁrst deﬁne a ‘crisis’ sample. Doing so boils down to deciding upon the stock markets
between which co-movement is to be analysed, and upon the trading days for which
the analysis is to be performed. The stock markets to be analysed are generally cho-
sen by ﬁrst selecting a ‘source’ market from which any contagion effects could have
originated, and then examine co-movement between this market and several other
stock markets in the region. Selecting this source usually requires some subjective
judgement by the researcher, for instance by assuming that contagion comes from the
1This chapter focuses on contagion between the mean of the returns, while alternatively Baele (2005) exam-
ines spillovers in their variance, and Fry, Martin, and Tang (2010) examine contagion between the skewness
and kurtosis of the market returns.Stock Market Contagion 45
country with the most developed stock market. When studying the 1997 Asian crisis,
Hong-Kong is often seen to be the culprit while for the 2007 Global Financial Crisis the
United States is regarded as the source. We examine synchronicity between individual
markets and the region to analyse the robustness of these choices, and analyse syn-
chronicity within the region as a whole to avoid selecting a source market altogether.
As is the case with the stock markets to be analysed, also choosing the trading days
to be examined often requires some subjective judgement. Chapter 3 explained that,
broadly speaking, two approaches exist: Forbes and Rigobon (2002) deﬁne a crisis
period using a ﬁxed time-frame after a critical event, while Bae, Karolyi, and Stulz
(2003) deﬁne the crisis sample as a quantile of returns which are considered ‘extreme’
in the sense that they exceed a given threshold (this quantile may be an adjacent period
but may also be a set of non-sequential trading days). Although both approaches can
be seen as canonical for the literature, deciding upon their underlying criteria is not
always straightforward. Over 90 years after the Great Crash it is still not clear what
can be considered the critical event that sent markets crashing down. In a similar vein,
it is not directly obvious what can be considered an extreme return. We take an eclectic
stance on these issues and study the robustness of both dating methods by examining
all possible combinations of starting dates and lengths for the crisis period, as well as
all possible threshold values of extreme returns for the crisis quantile.
One of the major themes in the contagion literature is the question of how to control
for common shocks driving the market returns, or, more broadly speaking, for their
fundamental economic driving forces. King and Wadhwani (1990) assume that eco-
nomic fundamentals are constant over time, and examine the difference between cor-
relation in tranquil and crisis times. Forbes and Rigobon (2002) acknowledge that fun-
damentals can be time-varying, and suggest to ‘adjust’ the correlation in crisis times
based on a model of fundamental stock market returns. Corsetti, Pericoli, and Sbracia
(2005) reﬁne this approach, and show that the speciﬁcation of the fundamental returns
model crucially determines how this correction should be implemented. Bekaert, Har-
vey, and Ng (2005) propose not to correct the co-movement measure itself, but instead
estimate a model of fundamental stock market returns and then examine the correla-
tion between its residuals. This way they avoid having to design an adjustment for the
chosen co-movement measure. We follow their approach and use a Vector Autoregres-46 Chapter 4
sion (VAR) model with commonly used indicators of economic fundamentals to ﬁlter
the market returns. In addition, we use local currency denominated returns to control
for exchange rate ﬂuctuations. If, in contrast, the local currency returns are converted
into a common currency, a sudden depreciation of the common currency against the
local currencies creates the impression of stock market co-movement where in reality
there is none (see Chapter 3).
Our results show that contagion is a phenomenon more heterogeneous than al-
ready acknowledged in the literature. While it is common practice to report results
for co-movement during a predeﬁned ‘crisis’ sample, we ﬁnd many combinations of
countries and time periods or return quantiles for which synchronicity is signiﬁcantly
elevated. These sub-samples, however, cannot be related to particular ‘crisis’ coun-
tries, periods or thresholds.
Our ﬁndings complement the conclusions of Caporale, Cipollini, and Spagnolo
(2005), who use a ﬂexible approach to deﬁne crisis periods and ﬁnd several outbreaks
of contagion during the Asian crisis. However, while they analyse contagion within
a window that tightly embraces the period commonly used for the Asian crisis, we
show that even during periods not generally associated with crises market synchronic-
ity increases. Furthermore, the synchronicity during periods normally associated with
ﬁnancial crises is not higher than the synchronicity during periods not normally as-
sociated with ﬁnancial crises. In that sense, stock market ﬂuctuations do not seem to
be especially contagious during ﬁnancial crises. Studying the determinants of excess
co-movement might shed more light on the existence of contagion, and is a fruitful
avenue for future research. In addition, there is nothing special about our method
that limits its use to the analysis of international stock market contagion. Natural al-
ternative applications would be to examine contagion in currency and bond markets
(see, for instance Favero and Giavazzi 2002, Gravelle, Kichian, and Morley 2006) or
to study the co-movement of individual stock prices (see, amongst others Barberis,
Schleifer, and Wurgler 2005, Jin and Myers 2010).2
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. The next section introduces
the synchronicity measure and discusses how to date ﬁnancial crises. Section 4.3 ap-
plies the synchronicity measure to the 1997 Asian crisis and the 2007 Global Financial
2Mink, Jacobs, and de Haan (2012) use the measure to examine output gap coherence in the euro area.Stock Market Contagion 47
Crisis. The ﬁnal section provides an interpretation of our results and offers some con-
cluding comments.
4.2 Method
4.2.1 Measuring stock market co-movement
Measuringstockmarketcontagionamountstostudyingthedifferenceinco-movement
in ﬁltered market returns (see below) between tranquil times and times of crisis. In its
purest form this boils down to performing a standard two-sample t-test:
t =
f crisis   f tranquil
Scrisis/
p
Tcrisis  t(n) (4.1)
where f is the value of the co-movement measure, S indicates the measure’s standard
deviation and T equals the number of trading days. If the value of the (one-tailed)
test statistic exceeds the critical value corresponding to the distribution’s degrees of
freedom n = Tcrisis   1 and the desired signiﬁcance level, the t-test concludes that co-
movement is higher during crisis periods than at tranquil times. Hence, a value of t
above the critical value indicates the existence of contagion.3
In order to measure co-movement between stock market returns we use the syn-
chronicity measure proposed by Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000), which reads
fNt =
max[n
up
t ,ndown
t ]
n
up
t + ndown
t
(4.2)
where n
up
t is the number of markets in which returns increased at trading day t, ndown
t
is the number of markets in which returns decreased, and N denotes the total number
of markets being studied. Thus, fNt indicates the proportion of markets that were
synchronised on trading day t. For N = 2 the measure equals 1 when both markets
3For simplicity we ignore the uncertainty surrounding the estimate for f tranquil when setting up the t-test.
If we allow for this uncertainty, the denominator of the test is
q
S2
crisis/Tcrisis + S2
tranquil/Ttranquil and the
degrees of freedom equal

S2
crisis/Tcrisis+S2
tranquil/Ttranquil
2
(S2
crisis/Tcrisis)
2
/(Tcrisis 1)+

S2
tranquil/Ttranquil
2
/(Ttranquil 1)
. In our empirical analysis,
the values for Ttranquil are large enough to avoid this simpliﬁcation from biasing our test results.48 Chapter 4
move in the same direction, and 0 when both markets move in opposite directions.
Synchronicity between a single country i and the rest of the N markets is denoted as
fiNt, which equals 1 when market i moves in the same direction as the majority of
the other markets, and 0 otherwise. In keeping with Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000),
the averages of these measures over time are deﬁned as fN for synchronicity between
N markets, and fiN for synchronicity of market i with the rest of the N markets. We
deﬁne f
tranquil
N and f
tranquil
iN as the values of synchronicity during tranquil periods, and
f crisis
N and f crisis
iN as the values during the crisis period.
For sufﬁciently large N, Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000) invoke the central limit the-
orem and relate the the difference between two observed synchronicity values to the
normal distribution. We instead relate this difference to the t distribution, but for
N = 2 notice that synchronicity on a given trading day can only equal 0 or 1, and thus
follows a binomial distribution. Therefore, for N = 2 we can test for a change in syn-
chronicity by examining whether the number of synchronous trading days during the
crisis period, Tcrisis f crisis, exceeds the critical value from the B

Tcrisis, f tranquil

distri-
bution.4 When analysing co-movement between a pair of markets using a measure
of correlation, this measure would need to be Fisher-transformed before the t test in
Equation (4.1) can be applied.5 The Fisher transformation, however, only applies when
market returns are normally distributed, and has low discriminatory power when the
examined crisis sample is small (see Dungey and Zhumabekova, 2001).
An advantage of measuring co-movement using the synchronicity measure instead
of using a measure of correlation, is that synchronicity can be calculated directly from
observed returns instead of from standardised returns.6 Such standardised returns
are obtained by demeaning and scaling the original market returns using the returns’
population mean and standard deviation. As these population parameters are unob-
served, they are usually estimated as the observed sample mean and standard error.
4Under the null-hypothesis that synchronicity during the crisis period f crisis is equal to synchronicity dur-
ing the tranquil period f tranquil, the observed number of synchronous trading days during the crisis period
Tcrisis f crisis thus follows a binomial distribution with the number of observations being equal to the number
of days in the crisis period Tcrisis, and the probability of success being equal to synchronicity during the
tranquil period f tranquil.
5The Fisher-transformed correlation coefﬁcient equals r = 0.5ln(1+ r)/(1  r), with r being the origi-
nal sample correlation statistic.
6This is not the case for the correlation between market returns, as this metric is deﬁned as the covariance
between standardised stock market returns. Also the adjustments of the correlation coefﬁcient that have
been proposed in the contagion literature require the market returns to be standardised.Stock Market Contagion 49
Table 4.1. Asian countries’ stock market returns on 20 October 1997
Original Standardised Standardised
return return - full period return - crisis period
Hong Kong -0.14 -6.22 -1.86
Indonesia -0.09 -3.95 -2.63
Japan -0.04 -2.85 -1.71
Korea -0.07 -2.73 -1.44
Malaysia -0.07 -2.54 -2.05
Philippines -0.06 -3.35 -2.38
Singapore -0.08 -4.76 -2.67
Taiwan -0.06 -4.08 -1.89
Thailand -0.06 -2.70 -1.98
The stock market indices are obtained from Thomson Datastream, and include the Hang Seng, Jakarta SE
Composite, Nikkei 225 Stock Average, Korea SE Composite, KLCI Composite, Philippine SE I, MSCI Singa-
pore, Taiwan SE Weighted, and the Bangkok SET, all expressed in local currencies. The full-sample period
runs from 1 January 1996 to 31 December 1998, the crisis period is taken from Forbes and Rigobon (2002)
and runs from Friday 17 October 1997 to Friday 14 November 1997.
However, in times of stock market turmoil such estimates may be biased since market
returns can be non-normal or heteroscedastic during such periods.
Consider, for instance, Table 4.1, which shows that the actual stock market return
in Hong Kong on 20 October 1997 equals  14 percent. Standardising this return using
the population mean and standard deviation estimated over the full 1996–1998 sample
suggests that the stock market return on 20 October 1997 is more than six standard
deviations below the population average. In contrast, standardising the return using
the population mean and standard deviation estimated over the Forbes and Rigobon
(2002) crisis period, i.e. the period from Friday 17 October 1997 to Friday 14 Novem-
ber 1997, suggests it is less than two standard deviations below this average. The
correlation between the actual returns and the crisis-sample standardised returns in
column three only equals 0.12. Standardised returns are therefore difﬁcult to interpret
when the underlying returns are non-normal or heteroscedastic, and, hence, so is the
co-movement between them.50 Chapter 4
4.2.2 Determining the crisis sample
Besides having to deﬁne a measure of stock market co-movement, it follows from
Equation (4.1) that to test for contagion we need to decide which periods are to be
identiﬁedascrisisperiodsandwhicharetobedeﬁnedastranquil. ForbesandRigobon
(2002) use an ‘event’ approach and deﬁne the crisis period for the Asian crisis to run
from Friday 17 October 1997 to Friday 14 November 1997. On the ﬁrst trading day of
this period the Hong Kong Stock exchange dropped by as much as 14 percent, while
it lost about 27 percent of its value during this entire month. We interpret this dating
method as implying that a crisis starts with a critical event and then eases out over a
one-month period. We apply this method to the Global Financial Crisis by letting the
crisis period run from Monday 15 September 2008 to Monday 13 October 2008, thus
starting on the day that the US investment bank Lehman Brothers went into adminis-
tration. As our second dating method we use the approach by Bae, Karolyi, and Stulz
(2003), who propose to deﬁne the crisis as the quantile of trading days in which re-
turns were below the 5th percentile of the returns distribution. Note that this approach
allows for crisis periods that need not be sequential. That is, it may be that two trading
days are identiﬁed as part of the crisis sample even though there was a tranquil day in
between.7
Dating crises on the basis of the approaches by Forbes and Rigobon (2002) and
Bae, Karolyi, and Stulz (2003) covers the two most common approaches used in the
literature, i.e. deﬁning the crisis sample as an adjacent time period or as a set of trading
days on which returns can by some measure be considered ‘extreme’. A disadvantage
of both methods, however, is that they require deﬁning the crisis sample based on a
ﬁxed criterion, that is, they in advance deﬁne the starting date and the length of the
crisis period, or the percentile for the crisis quantile. To test the robustness of these
choices, we analyse all potential crisis samples that can be generated in line with the
above two dating approaches.
Wevarythestartingdateandlengthoftheperiodinallpossibleways. Thisexercise
7Applying the synchronicity measure to extreme returns is related to the coexeedance approach of Bae,
Karolyi, and Stulz (2003). We examine contagion by testing whether synchronicity between extreme returns
is higher than synchronicity between all returns, while Bae, Karolyi, and Stulz (2003) examine contagion
by testing whether synchronicity between extreme returns is higher than synchronicity between extreme
returns generated from statistical models of countries’ stock market returns.Stock Market Contagion 51
requires that for each trading day in the sample, we examine crisis periods that start
on this date and have a length of 1,2,...,t, with t being the number of days until the
end of the sample. This approach can be interpreted as a rolling window exercise as
proposed by Billio and Pelizzon (2003), where we examine windows of all possible
lengths. As the synchronicity measure can be calculated on a daily basis we can even
study crisis periods as short as a single trading day.
To analyse all potential crisis quantiles, we vary the cut-off point from where a
return is deemed extreme. To this end, we deﬁne the kth crisis quantile as the set of
tradingdaysduringwhichatleastoneofthecountriesintheregionexperiencedoneof
its k percent most negative stock market returns, where k = 1,2,...,100. As a result, we
gain insight into whether the synchronicity between markets depends on the returns’
amplitude. For all these different crisis samples, we examine whether synchronicity
differs signiﬁcantly from its full-sample average using the approach described in Sec-
tion 4.2.
4.3 Results
We use the synchronicity measures to analyse contagion between Asian countries’
stock markets during the ﬁnancial crisis of 1996–1998, and between Western countries’
stock markets during the Global Financial Crisis of 2006–2008. We examine the syn-
chronicity of individual stock markets with Hong Kong, with the United States, with
the region, and within the region as a whole. In order to control for the impact of eco-
nomic fundamentals on market returns, Forbes and Rigobon (2002) and Dungey, Fry,
Gonzales-Hermosillo, and Martin (2005) ﬁlter the returns of the stock markets with a
daily Vector Autoregression while including the short term US interest rate as a com-
mon factor driving market returns. Similarly, Bekaert, Harvey, and Ng (2005) and Baur
and Fry (2009) ﬁlter the returns with a Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI)
world index as the common factor. The advantage of using the MSCI world index is
that it captures more common economic forces present in the market than purely the
US interest rate. Hence, we follow this approach and ﬁlter the market returns using
a VAR with 5 lags (i.e. the length of the trading week) and the MSCI world index52 Chapter 4
included as an exogenous variable.8
A sometimes overlooked but equally important common factor is the currency in
which the returns on the stock markets under scrutiny are measured (see Chapter 3).
For example, if two non-synchronous stock market returns are converted into a com-
mon currency and both currencies simultaneously depreciate or appreciate against this
common currency, the stock market returns would seem to be synchronous also when
they are not. Hence, we follow Longin and Solnik (1995), and “use returns in local
currencies to focus on the correlation across markets rather than across currencies.”
We assume that the above ﬁltering procedure corrects for the impact of any com-
mon factors on the market returns, so that we can attribute any changes in the syn-
chronicity between the ﬁltered returns to contagion effects. This is in line with Bekaert,
Harvey, and Ng (2005), although these authors use a more sophisticated model of as-
set returns. Our ﬁndings are thus conditional upon the speciﬁcation of the ﬁltering
procedure, a point most clearly made by Corsetti, Pericoli, and Sbracia (2005). These
authors also explain that this caveat necessarily applies to all analyses of contagion, ba-
sically because co-movement in excess of fundamentals cannot be established before
taking a stance on what these unobserved fundamentals actually are (see also Chapter
4). While the analysis below does not escape from this vulnerability either, we believe
its conclusions are sufﬁciently general to hold also in the presence of this caveat.
4.3.1 The 1997 Asian crisis
In the run-up to the Asian crisis, countries in the region had experienced large foreign
capital inﬂows, which spurred economic growth and thereby gave rise to the idea of an
‘Asian miracle’. From the mid-1990s this perception changed, leading to speculative
attacks against the Thai Baht during May 1997. These attacks forced the Thai govern-
ment to abandon the peg to the US dollar, marking what is now considered to be the
start of the Asian crisis. During this period countries in the region were confronted
with large capital outﬂows. Figure 4.1 shows that these outﬂows had a large impact
on stock markets as well. For some of these countries the stock market decline lasted
the full period, while for notably Hong Kong and Taiwan they started only after mid-
8Using alternative speciﬁcations for the VAR model does not qualitatively affect our conclusions.Stock Market Contagion 53
1997. The 27 percent fall of the Hong Kong index following Friday 17 October 1997 is
clearly the largest stock market crash observed in the sample.
Table 4.2 reports the results of a contagion analysis for our two alternative ap-
proaches to identify the crisis sample. The ﬁrst approach is based on Forbes and
Rigobon (2002), who take the one-month period starting on Friday 17 October 1997,
the date after which the Hong Kong index collapsed. The second approach is based
on Bae, Karolyi, and Stulz (2003), who focus on the quantile of trading days with the
5 percent most negative returns observed during the full-sample period. We examine
whether synchronicity during both sub-samples differs signiﬁcantly from synchronic-
ity during the full-sample period, which runs from 1 January 1996 to 31 December
1998. The reported p-values indicate the probability that synchronicity is constant
across both samples.
The ﬁrst rows in the table report the synchronicity of individual stock markets with
Hong Kong, which Forbes and Rigobon (2002) assume to be the source of any conta-
gion effects. As can be seen, synchronicity between for instance Indonesia and Hong
Kong over the full-sample is 0.61, whereas it equals 0.76 during the examined crisis
period. The third column shows that this increase in synchronicity is not statistically
different from zero at the ﬁve percent level of signiﬁcance, which holds for the other
countries as well. For Taiwan, synchronicity during the crisis period is actually sig-
niﬁcantly lower than during the full sample. During the crisis quantile based on Bae,
Karolyi, and Stulz (2003), synchronicity between Indonesia and Hong Kong amounts
to 0.61, which is exactly the same as synchronicity for the full-sample period. With the
exception of Singapore, synchronicity during the crisis quantile is never signiﬁcantly
higher than its full-sample average.
The analysis so far assumes that Hong Kong was the source of any contagion ef-
fects. As synchronicity of Hong Kong with the other countries in the sample is almost
never signiﬁcantly elevated, we relax this assumption and in the next rows examine
synchronicity of each individual country with the region fiN. When this level is sig-
niﬁcantly higher than during the full-sample period, it becomes more likely that the
country examined was the source of any contagion effects to the rest of the region.
For the crisis period by Forbes and Rigobon (2002) we never ﬁnd synchronicity to be
signiﬁcantly elevated, but for the crisis quantile by Bae, Karolyi, and Stulz (2003) it is54 Chapter 4
Figure 4.1. Asian countries’ stock market indices during 1996–1998 (January 1st 1996 =
100)
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signiﬁcantly higher for Malaysia and Taiwan. Synchronicity between Hong Kong and
the region during both crisis samples is not signiﬁcantly different from its full-sample
value. The last row shows that also synchronicity within the region fN is signiﬁcantly
higher during the crisis quantile, but not during the crisis period.
The limited evidence for contagion from the above analysis not only casts doubt
on the assumption that Hong Kong was the ‘source’ of any contagion effects, but also
raises the question of whether the chosen ‘crisis’ samples are the correct ones. Hence,
we relax both these assumptions and examine synchronicity between individual coun-
tries and the region fiN and within the region fN as a whole for all crisis samples pos-
sible over the full 1996–1998 time period. For the crisis dating approach by Forbes and
Rigobon (2002), this exercise implies that we examine crisis periods with all possible
starting dates and with lengths varying between 1,2,...,t, with t being the number of
days from the starting date to the end of the sample. For the crisis dating approach by
Bae, Karolyi, and Stulz (2003), we examine crisis quantiles by focusing on trading days
during which at least one of the countries in the region experienced a return below a
given threshold value, where we vary this threshold in such a manner that the quantile
includes the k percent most negative stock market returns, with k = 1,2,...,100. For all
these different crisis periods and quantiles, we examine whether synchronicity differs
signiﬁcantly from its full-sample average.
Figure 4.2 reports the results for the dating approach based on Forbes and Rigobon
(2002). The ﬁgure shows all periods for which synchronicity between individual coun-
tries and the region fiN was higher than the full-sample average at the ﬁve percent
level of signiﬁcance. The left axis indicates by how much synchronicity was elevated,
whilethebottomaxisindicatesoverwhichtimeperiodthiswasthecase. Therightaxis
indicates the level of the Hong Kong stock market index. The upper left graph for in-
stance shows that synchronicity between Hong Kong and the region was signiﬁcantly
increased by about 0.05 points from 1997Q3 to 1998Q4. Within this period, synchronic-
ity was signiﬁcantly elevated by a larger amount during several sub-periods, such as
the last month of 1997Q3 where it was 0.26 points higher than the full-sample value.
Between 1996Q4 and 1997Q3, and during all possible sub-periods within this interval,
synchronicity was never signiﬁcantly different from the full-sample level.
As the graphs in the ﬁgure show, synchronicity between individual countries andStock Market Contagion 57
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the region is signiﬁcantly higher than its full-sample average for several sub-sample
periods. These periods vary in length and starting date, and differ across countries.
While they sometimes coincide with the crash of the Hong Kong index in October
1997, many of these periods are unrelated to this event. In fact, around the time of the
crash, synchronicity between Hong Kong and the region is less elevated than during
many other sub-sample periods. These results suggest that there is not a clear ‘source’
country of any contagion effects, since each country now and then experiences signif-
icantly elevated synchronicity with the region. In addition, the results suggest that
there is no clear ‘crisis’ period, since many periods can be found during which syn-
chronicity is elevated.
Analogous to Figure 4.2, Figure 4.3 reports for which periods synchronicity within
the region as a whole fN was higher than its full-sample average. For instance, for
the 1997–1998 period synchronicity was signiﬁcantly elevated by about 0.01 points,
while during several sub-periods within this interval it had increased by more than
0.15 points. The ﬁgure conﬁrms that periods of increased synchronicity vary in length
and starting date, and do not seem to be especially associated with the Hong Kong
stock market crash. While synchronicity is signiﬁcantly higher by 0.13 points on 20
October 1997, the ﬁrst day on which the index started to fall, it is much more elevated
during several other periods. Sometimes synchronicity is signiﬁcantly different from
its full-sample average during periods as short as two trading days. A correlation anal-
ysis would not be able to bring this observation to the fore, since the sample correlation
between stock markets cannot be calculated for such short time periods.
Figures 4.4 and 4.5 report the results for the dating approach based on Bae, Karolyi,
and Stulz (2003), again focusing on synchronicity between individual countries and
the region fiN, and on synchronicity within the region as a whole fN. The bottom axis
indicates the crisis quantile under consideration, with the value of 5 for instance in-
dicating the quantile comprising the ﬁve percent most negative returns (as used for
the analysis in Table 4.2). The left axis indicates the probability that synchronicity for
this crisis quantile was equal to its full-sample average, with values closer to zero sig-
nalling that synchronicity was elevated during the crisis quantile (the scale is inverted
so that an increase in the graph is associated with higher synchronicity). As before,
we interpret p-values lower than 5 percent as a rejection of the null-hypothesis thatStock Market Contagion 59
Figure 4.3. Synchronicity within the Asian region for all potential crisis periods during
1996–1998
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The ﬁgure shows all periods for which synchronicity fN was higher than the full-sample average at the
ﬁve percent level of signiﬁcance. The left axis indicates by how much synchronicity was elevated, while the
bottom axis indicates over which time period this was the case. The right axis indicates the level of the Hong
Kong stock market index (gray line).60 Chapter 4
synchronicity is equal to its level during the full-sample period.
The patterns in Figure 4.4 show that synchronicity between individual countries
and the region is generally not higher when one of these countries experiences an
extremely negative stock market return. The only exceptions to this observation are
Malaysia, which experiences signiﬁcantly higher synchronicity levels when the crisis
sample comprises returns in the lower 1, 2, 5, 6, and 10 percent of the distribution, and
Taiwan for crisis samples comprising returns amongst the 3 to 9 percent most negative
ones of the distribution. For Japan, in contrast, synchronicity with the region is signif-
icantly lower when one of the countries experiences a highly negative market return.
For all other countries, synchronicity in the crisis sample is generally not signiﬁcantly
higher than synchronicity during the full-sample period. Again, our results provide no
evidence for the existence of a particular ‘source’ country or ‘crisis’ quantile associated
with any contagion effects.9
Figure 4.5 reports the results for synchronicity in the region as a whole. While
synchronicity was already found to be elevated when we focus on the 5 percent most
negative returns, see Table 4.2, it is also signiﬁcantly elevated when we change this
threshold to 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, or 9 percent. In general, the p-values tend to increase
gradually when the crisis quantile is expanded and less extreme returns are included
as well. The ﬁgure thus shows that synchronicity within the region is higher when
an extreme return is observed, but at the same time makes clear there is no natural
extreme return threshold to distinguish a ‘crisis’ and a ‘tranquil’ sub-sample.
4.3.2 The 2007 Global Financial Crisis
The Global Financial Crisis started during the middle of 2007 with the burst of the
US housing bubble accompanied by rising default rates on mortgages sold in the sub-
prime market segment. While this ﬁrst affected mortgage originators themselves, the
crisis quickly spread through ﬁnancial markets because these parties had transferred
default risk on originated mortgages to third party investors on a large scale by selling
mortgage-backed securities. Since such securities were also widely used as collateral
9The p-values in the graphs converge to 0.5 when the crisis sample becomes larger, reﬂecting the fact that
synchronicity during the crisis sample then converges to synchronicity during the full-sample period. The
probability that one of both values is larger than the other then exactly equals ﬁfty percent.Stock Market Contagion 61
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Figure 4.5. Probability of constant synchronicity within the Asian region for all poten-
tial crisis quantiles during 1996–1998
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
The bottom axis indicates the percentage of extreme negative returns included in the crisis quantile, while
the (inverted) left axis indicates the probability that synchronicity fN for this crisis quantile was equal to its
full-sample average.Stock Market Contagion 63
in markets for wholesale funding, the increasing mortgage default rates and the rise
in risk premiums caused by this development triggered the 2007 Global Financial Cri-
sis.10 Also stock markets were affected, especially in countries with relatively large
ﬁnancial sectors such as Belgium, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, the Netherlands,
Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. Figure 4.6 shows that since
mid-2007 these countries’ stock market indices declined almost in parallel.
Table 4.3 reports results similar to those reported in Table 4.2 for the 1997 Asian
crisis. We deﬁne the crisis period based on the approach by Forbes and Rigobon (2002)
as the month following the major crisis event in the sample, which we choose to be
the collapse of Lehman Brothers on Monday 15 September 2008. For the crisis quantile
based on Bae, Karolyi, and Stulz (2003) we again focus on those days where one of the
countries experienced a negative return in the 5 percent tail of the distribution.
The ﬁrst rows in the table report synchronicity between individual countries and
the United States, which could be considered the source of any contagion effects. For
the crisis period based on Forbes and Rigobon (2002) this measure turns out to be sig-
niﬁcantly elevated for France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, with the increase in
synchronicity amounting to about 0.20 points. For the crisis sub-sample based on Bae,
Karolyi, and Stulz (2003) we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant increase in synchronicity for Germany
only.
We now relax the assumption of the United States being the source of any conta-
gion effects, and focus in the next rows of the table on the results for synchronicity of
each individual country with the region fiN. It turns out that synchronicity between an
individual country and the region is never signiﬁcantly elevated, neither for the crisis
period by Forbes and Rigobon (2002) nor for the crisis quantile by Bae, Karolyi, and
Stulz (2003). Also synchronicity between the United States and the region is only sig-
niﬁcantly higher at the ten-percent level during the crisis period. Synchronicity within
the region as a whole is signiﬁcantly higher for the crisis period as well as the crisis
quantile.
Figure 4.7 examines whether any other combinations of countries and time periods
can be found during which synchronicity with the region fiN signiﬁcantly increased
relative to the full-sample value. The ﬁgure shows that for France, Ireland, Switzer-
10Brunnermeier (2009) provides an extensive discussion of the chain of events.64 Chapter 4
Figure 4.6. Western countries’ stock market indices during 2006–2008 (January 2nd
2006 = 100)
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The reported stock market indices are obtained from Thomson Datastream, and include the BEL 20, CAC
40, DAX 30, OMX Iceland All-share, ISEQ Overall Index, AEX Index, SMI, FTSE 100, and S&P 500 (at 16:00
GMT), all expressed in local currencies.Stock Market Contagion 65
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land, the United Kingdom, and the United States, synchronicity with the region is
indeed signiﬁcantly higher during the aftermath of the Lehman collapse. This is not
the case for the other countries in the sample, while for all countries synchronicity is el-
evated during several sub-sample periods that cannot be associated with the collapse.
This amount of sub-sample periods seems to be somewhat smaller than the amount for
the Asian crisis reported in Figure 4.2, which suggests that during the Global Financial
Crisis the interaction between stock markets was more stable. As was the case for the
East-Asian crisis, the graphs do not provide clear evidence for a ‘source’ country or
‘crisis’ country during for which any contagion effects were particularly pronounced.
Figure 4.8 examines synchronicity within the region for alternative crisis periods.
While the graph conﬁrms that synchronicity signiﬁcantly increased around the col-
lapse of Lehman Brothers, during many periods around this event it is elevated by
much more than the 0.03 points reported in Table 4.3 for the crisis month identiﬁed
based on Forbes and Rigobon (2002). In addition, the graphs show that the increases
in synchronicity around September 2008 are smaller than several increases observed
during sub-sample periods unrelated to the Lehman turmoil. The analysis thus con-
ﬁrms our ﬁnding from the Asian crisis that periods of elevated synchronicity vary in
length and starting date, and do not seem to be associated with particular crisis events.
Figure 4.9 reports p-values for the test whether synchronicity is constant for alter-
native crisis samples deﬁned on the basis of Bae, Karolyi, and Stulz (2003). Again, in
most cases the graphs do not provide much evidence for synchronicity being signif-
icantly higher during trading days with extreme returns. For France, the increase in
synchronicity is only signiﬁcant for the 11 percent most negative returns, for Ireland
for the 2 to 4 percent most negative returns, and for the United States for the 2 percent
most negative returns. For several other countries, synchronicity on days with extreme
returns lies below the full-sample average, and even signiﬁcantly so for Belgium and
Iceland for the 1 percent most negative returns. These ﬁndings again provide little
evidence for the existence of a ‘source’ country or ‘crisis’ quantile.
Figure 4.10 shows that synchronicity within the region as a whole, fN, is signiﬁ-
cantly elevated for the 2 to 11 percent most negative returns. The graph shows that
there is no natural extreme return threshold to separate a ‘crisis’ and a ‘tranquil’ sub-
sample.Stock Market Contagion 67
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Figure 4.8. Synchronicity within the Western region for all potential crisis periods
during 2006–2008
.0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
0
200
400
600
800
1,000
1,200
1,400
1,600
I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV
2006 2007 2008
The ﬁgure shows all periods for which synchronicity fN was higher than the full-sample average at the ﬁve
percent level of signiﬁcance. The left axis indicates by how much synchronicity was elevated, while the
bottom axis indicates over which time period this was the case. The right axis indicates the level of the US
stock market index (gray line).Stock Market Contagion 69
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Figure 4.10. Probability of constant synchronicity within the Western region for all
potential crisis quantiles during 2006–2008
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The bottom axis indicates the percentage of extreme negative returns included in the crisis quantile, while
the (inverted) left axis indicates the probability that synchronicity fN for this crisis quantile was equal to its
full-sample average.Stock Market Contagion 71
4.4 Conclusion
In this chapter we examine how conclusions about stock market contagion during the
1996–1998 Asian crisis and the 2007–2009 Global Financial Crisis depend on the choice
of the ‘crisis’ sample. To this end, we extend the synchronicity measure of Morck,
Yeung, and Yu (2000) and apply it to international stock markets. The synchronicity
measure does not require standardisation of the market returns, which can give results
that are difﬁcult to interpret when market returns are non-normal or heteroscedastic.
In addition, we show that the synchronicity measure can easily be applied to a larger
group of countries without having to deﬁne the ‘source’ of any contagion effects, while
it can be calculated for crisis samples as small as a single trading day.
Our empirical results allow us to make a number of observations. First, choosing
one country to be the ‘source’ of any contagion effects seems relatively restrictive. This
is most clear for the 1997 Asian crisis, where synchronicity of individual countries with
respect to Hong Kong, which is traditionally assumed to be the source of any conta-
gion effects, is never signiﬁcantly elevated during the crisis period identiﬁed by Forbes
and Rigobon (2002). For the 2007 Global Financial Crisis, a few countries experience
elevated synchronicity with the United States during the month following the collapse
of Lehman Brothers, but for most countries such an effect is absent. We therefore relax
the assumption of choosing a source country, and focus on synchronicity of individual
countries with the rest of the region. We also analyse synchronicity within the region
as a whole, where all countries are given equal weights.
Second, we ﬁnd that focusing on a predeﬁned subset of trading days is quite re-
strictive as well. To arrive at this conclusion we examine the approach of Forbes and
Rigobon (2002), who focus on a crisis period with a given length and starting date, and
the approach by Bae, Karolyi, and Stulz (2003), who focus on a crisis quantile with neg-
ative market returns lower than a given threshold. When we examine crisis periods
of all possible lengths and starting dates, and crisis quantiles for all possible thresh-
old values, we ﬁnd several sub-samples for which synchronicity was higher than the
full-sample average. These sub-samples differ across countries, however, and are not
associated with particular crisis events or with particular threshold values for extreme
stock market returns.72 Chapter 4
Our results show that contagion is a phenomenon more heterogeneous than al-
ready acknowledged in the literature. While it is common practice to report results
for co-movement with a predeﬁned source country and during a predeﬁned crisis pe-
riod or quantile, we ﬁnd many ‘source’ countries and ‘crisis’ periods or quantiles for
which co-movement is signiﬁcantly elevated. These sub-samples cannot be related
to particular crisis events or extreme return thresholds, suggesting that stock market
ﬂuctuations during ﬁnancial crises are not especially contagious. Studying the deter-
minants of increases in co-movement might contribute to identifying contagion effects,
and is a fruitful avenue for future research.Chapter 5
Contagion from Bank Defaults
*This chapter is based on Mink (2010).74 Chapter 5
5.1 Introduction
“The provision of [...] liquidity support undermines the efﬁcient pricing of risk by pro-
viding ex post insurance for risky behaviour. That encourages excessive risk-taking,
and sows the seeds of a future ﬁnancial crisis.” Mervyn King, Governor of the Bank of
England, made this statement on 12 September 2007, only two days before he had to
grant emergency liquidity assistance to Northern Rock. Ever since, ﬁscal and mone-
tary authorities all over the world have engaged in massive rescue operations aimed
at stabilising the global ﬁnancial system. These rescue operations not only made use
of conventional policy instruments such as the provision of emergency liquidity assis-
tance, but also involved extending deposit guarantee schemes, insuring or purchasing
‘troubled’ assets, providing capital injections, and even nationalising ﬁnancial inter-
mediaries (BIS 2009).
Fiscal and monetary authorities not only engaged in these rescue operations to pro-
tect (retail) depositors, but also to avoid contagion (BIS 2009, p. 24). Fears of contagion
were based on the belief that the insolvency of one ﬁnancial intermediary can have
a destabilising impact on other intermediaries as well, which might destabilise the ﬁ-
nancial system as a whole and thereby disrupt the functioning of the real economy (De
Bandt and Hartmann 2002). Avoiding these destabilising effects was the main moti-
vation for the US government to rescue investment bank Bear Stearns and insurance
company AIG, since the contagion effects that could be triggered by these companies’
bankruptcies were believed to be particularly large (see Bernanke 2008, Federal Re-
serve Board 2008). Both cases illustrate how the 2007 Global Financial Crisis led ﬁnan-
cial regulators to become increasingly concerned with preventing contagion from the
failure of so-called ‘systemically important’ ﬁnancial institutions (see IMF 2009, Brun-
nermeier, Crockett, Goodhart, Persaud, and Shin 2009).
The recent empirical literature on contagion has focused on the banking sector, and
various studies conﬁrm that banks tend to become unstable simultaneously.1 How-
ever, the fact that distress situations coincide across banks does not imply that there
1Examples are Lehar (2005), Hartmann, Straetmans, and De Vries (2006), Gropp, Lo Duca, and Vesala
(2009), and Zhou (2009), who focus on correlation between returns in the tail of the distribution. Elsinger,
Lehar, and Summer (2006), Adrian and Brunnermeier (2008), and Tarashev, Borio, and Tsatsaronis (2009)
calculate measures of risk in the ﬁnancial system as a whole, and decompose these into the contributions of
individual banks.Bank Contagion 75
was contagion between them, with instability of one bank causing the instability of
another. The coincidence can also be the result of common shocks hitting banks with
similar balance sheets, for instance because they all invested in the American housing
market, or have similar funding structures (see also Chapter 2). Indeed, Calomiris and
Mason (1997) conclude that “failures during the [1932 Chicago bank] panic reﬂected
the relative weakness of failing banks in the face of a common asset value shock rather
than contagion”. Likewise, Wall and Peterson (1990) ﬁnd little evidence to support
the concerns about bank runs around the 1984 Continental Illinois default. Similarly,
Aharony and Swary (1983) ﬁnd that large bank failures only have an impact on other
banks’ stock prices when they are caused by problems whose revelation is correlated
across banks, but not when the default is due to bank-speciﬁc factors such as inter-
nal fraud. Kho, Lee, and Stulz (2000) show that markets distinguish between exposed
and non-exposed banks during a crisis, with losses of the exposed banks not spilling
over to the unexposed ones. Finally, Furﬁne (2003), Upper and Worms (2004), and
Van Lelyveld and Liedorp (2006) focus on direct exposures in the market for interbank
loans, and ﬁnd that the potential for contagion is rather limited.
These rejections of the contagion hypothesis seem to be at odds with policymakers’
concerns as described above. Therefore, this chapter aims to disentangle the impact of
contagion and common shocks on banks’ market values during the Global Financial
Crisis of 2007–2009. Our identiﬁcation strategy is based on the presumption that if
ﬁnancial markets expect a bank’s default to be contagious, as implied by the contagion
hypothesis, an increase in their assessment of this bank’s default probability should
lead to a decline in other banks’ market valuations. For a global sample of the one
hundred largest banks, we therefore regress changes in banks’ stock market values on
changes in other banks’ default risk. Since this analysis yields virtually no evidence for
interbank contagion, it suggests that ﬁnancial markets expect this risk to be of minor
importance compared to the impact of adverse common shocks hitting multiple banks
at the same time.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 introduces our
method to model and estimate bank contagion, Section 5.3 describes the data used in
the empiricalanalysis, andSection 5.4presents our results. Theﬁnal sectionconcludes.76 Chapter 5
5.2 Method
5.2.1 Modeling bank contagion
There are several channels through which the default of one bank can cause otherwise
healthy banks to suffer losses as well. The ﬁrst, classic contagion channel is the in-
terconnectedness between banks, for instance through loan and derivative exposures.
An insolvent bank that defaults on its obligations will cause losses to other banks (see
Allen and Gale 2000, Freixas, Parigi, and Rochet 2000). Second, Wagner (2010b) and
Brunnermeier, Crockett, Goodhart, Persaud, and Shin (2009) describe how an outﬂow
of funds can force one bank to engage in a ﬁre sale of assets. Especially for illiquid
assets such ﬁre sales will depress market prices, which via mark-to-market account-
ing has to be reﬂected by write-downs on the value of similar assets on other banks’
balance sheets. Third, contagion can arise from the opacity of banks’ balance sheets,
which requires investors to evaluate the value of their own bank’s assets using pub-
lic signals about the assets of other banks. One bank’s default can this way trigger a
run on other banks as well, with liquidity shortages and losses as a consequence (see
Diamond and Dybvig 1983, Chen 1999).
The actual losses stemming from these contagion effects are hard to measure em-
pirically, not the least because government rescue operations render defaults of large,
potentially systemic banks a rarely observed phenomenon. We can however examine
ﬁnancial market data to measure the expected losses from contagion. If ﬁnancial mar-
kets expect one bank’s default to cause losses for other banks as well, an increase in
their assessment of this bank’s default probability should lower market valuations of
these other banks. The reduction in these other banks’ market valuation reﬂects the
change in the expected value of contagious losses from all channels outlined above,
including market players’ expectations of any domino and feedback effects between
banks.
Based on the above considerations we model the change in a bank’s market value
at time t as
ynt = an + bn ft + å
m6=n
gmpmt + ent, (5.1)
where ynt denotes the change in bank n’s stock market valuation at time t with n 2Bank Contagion 77
(1, N) and t 2 (1,T), ft indicates the market factor, pmt equals the probability that
bank m will default in the future, and ent captures idiosyncratic factors driving bank
n’s market value. When there is no contagion, the model relates the change in bank n’s
market value to a constant an and a market factor ft, in line with the capital asset pric-
ing model. The parameter bn indicates to what extent changes in the market value of
bank n are driven by the common market factor, causing these changes to be correlated
with market value changes of bank m and others. The parameter gm indicates to what
extent changes in banks’ market value are caused by changes in bank m’s default risk,
taking the effect of contagion into account. If the default of a bank m would cause con-
tagious losses for other banks, parameter gm will be negative since an increase in pm
then leads markets to price the higher expected value of these losses, causing market
value ynt to decline.2
Equation (5.1) makes clear that even when no actual bank defaults occur, we can
still examine the impact of contagion on banks’ market values. This is the case because
forward-looking markets price the expected costs of potential future bank defaults, by
responding to changes in these banks’ default probabilities. Since these default prob-
abilities and the changes therein are close to zero in normal times and only become
substantial during ﬁnancial crises, our empirical model is in line with the contagion
deﬁnition by Forbes and Rigobon (2002), who focus on increased shock transmission
during periods of crisis (see also Chapter 3). While Forbes and Rigobon (2002) model
contagion as a sudden increase in the parameter bn during such periods, with the chal-
lenge being to distinguish this parameter instability from an increase in the variance
of the unobserved market factor ft, we model contagion as the impact of a sudden
increase in the variable pm. When ﬁnancial markets incorporate information about
such default probabilities into other banks’ market valuations, increasing bank default
probabilities can lead to parallel declines in stock prices similar to the ones analysed
by Forbes and Rigobon (2002).
2We assume the impact of contagion from bank m is the same across all N banks on the left-hand-side
of the regression equation. This restriction is necessary to reduce the number of contagion parameters to
be estimated, which would otherwise increase from N to N (N   1). As a result, the parameter estimates
will pick up contagion from banks who are truly ‘systemically important’, i.e. whose failure would have an
impact on multiple banks at the same time.78 Chapter 5
5.2.2 Estimating bank contagion
In matrix notation, for the tth observation, the model in Equation (5.1) can be written
as
yt = a + bft + Gpt + et, (5.2)
where yt is an N  1 vector of changes in banks’ market values, G is the N  N matrix
equal to iNg0 but with diagonal elements replaced by zeros, and iN is an N-vector
of ones and g  (g1,...,gN)
0. To write this model in the usual regression format we
rewrite Gpt as Atg, where At = inp0
t   diag(pt). The entire model is now
y = (iT 
 IN)a + f 
 b + Ag + e, (5.3)
with A the NT  T matrix of all the At’s stacked on top of each other. Equation (5.3) is
a standard panel regression equation, apart from the unknown factor f  (ft,..., fT)
0.
We estimate this factor as the coefﬁcient vector from the regression
r = Df + h, (5.4)
where r is the residual vector for the regression of y on (iT 
 IN) and A. The NT  T
matrix D consists of all N  T matrices Dt stacked on top of each other, where Dt is a
matrix of zeros with ones on the tth column.
To estimate the model we apply a three-step approach. First, we regress bank mar-
ket values yt on a set of bank ﬁxed effects and default probabilities pt. Second, we
regress the residuals rt from this regression on a set of period ﬁxed effects to obtain
the market factor f.3 Finally, we add this market factor as an explanatory variable to
the ﬁrst-step regression and re-estimate this regression to obtain the model coefﬁcients
in Equation (5.1). We calculate conﬁdence bounds around these coefﬁcients using a
standard bootstrap procedure. In particular, we resample the residuals within cross-
sections and repeat the three estimation steps for 1000 bootstrap replications, using the
3We estimating the market factor from the ﬁrst-step residuals r rather than from the market values y to
make sure it is orthogonal to the default probabilities. This way we avoid the market factor to pick up
any common variation across market values that should have been attributed to changes in bank default
probabilities. However, this approach does introduce the risk that the estimated contagion coefﬁcients pick
up some of the effects of the market factor, which would lead us to overestimate them.Bank Contagion 79
dispersion of coefﬁcient estimates to construct 95-percent conﬁdence intervals.4
5.3 Data
We calculate changes in market values as the change in the value of banks’ outstanding
equity, while we use changes in banks’ credit default swap (CDS) spreads as indicators
of changes in their default risk. CDS-spreads have the advantage that they are directly
observed in ﬁnancial markets. Moreover, they have been widely used as indicators of
default risk by practitioners, policy makers and academics alike. A caveat associated
with using these spreads is that they do not purely measure a bank’s expected prob-
ability of default, but indicate the percentage premium to be paid for an insurance
against the risk that bank m does not repay its outstanding debt in full. The spread
therefore is also a function of the losses on bank m’s debt given that it defaults, and of
the risk that the writer of the CDS-contract defaults himself.
As an alternative to using CDS-spreads as indicators of bank default risk, we fol-
low Crosbie and Bohn (2003) and calculate probabilities of default by mapping banks’
distances to default to the cumulative density function of the standard normal distri-
bution. While calculating the distance to default requires several variables as inputs
that are not observed on a high-frequency basis, Bystr¨ om (2006) shows that especially
for banks, the distance to default can be approximated by the inverse of the expected
volatility of equity returns.5 We thus calculate the probability of default as
pmt = N ( 1/sm,t+1), (5.5)
where sm,t+1 equals the standard deviation of equity returns at time t+1. We calculate
4The estimates of the contagion coefﬁcients are not affected by government bailouts of bank m, since the ob-
served ﬂuctuations in bank m’s CDS-spread or default probability are already conditional upon the prospect
of such rescue operations taking place. Also potential government guarantees for bank i are unlikely to af-
fect our results. These guarantees are after all designed to shield bank i’s bondholders from losses, but do
not aim to protect the bank’s shareholders. See also King (2009). Finally, the contagion coefﬁcients could in
theory be underestimated due to governments intending to mitigate the contagious impact of bank m’s de-
fault through for instance providing additional liquidity to the system or buying troubled assets. Changes in
the prospect of such mitigating measures would however drive market values and CDS-spreads in opposite
directions. As this inverse relationship is also implied by the contagion hypothesis, the omission of such
changes from our regression equation could just as well cause contagion coefﬁcients to be overestimated.
5Using equity volatility as a measure of default risk is quite common in the literature, see for instance
Saunders, Strock, and Travlos (1990), Esty (1998), Gonz´ alez (2005), Stiroh (2006) and Laeven and Levine
(2010).80 Chapter 5
sm,t+1 as the one-period ahead forecast from a GARCH(1,1) model ﬁtted to weekly
logarithmic equity returns.6 In this way we can infer changes in banks’ market values
y as well as in their default probabilities p directly from stock market data.7
We obtain data on banks’ stock market values between January 1st 2007 and De-
cember 31st 2009 from Thomson Datastream.8 Table 5.1 reports the 96 banks that we
include in the analysis, of which 26 are located in the United States and 70 are from
countriesintheEuropeanUnion. Ourselectionofbankscoversthelargestpartofthese
regions’ banking systems. We calculate y as the weekly change in these banks’ stock
market values, expressed in local currencies (see Chapter 3). By focusing on weekly
data, our analysis is less sensitive to noise in the market returns and to any time lags
in the response of market values to changes in default probabilities. We obtain 5-year
CDS-spreads on senior debt from Thomson Datastream for a sub-sample of 55 banks,
indicated with an asterisk in Table 5.1.
Figure 5.1 shows the development over time of the cross-sectional averages of
banks’ market values, probabilities of default, and CDS-spreads. The graph in the top
panel illustrates that banks’ market values have substantially declined over the 2007–
2008 period. During the second and third quarter of 2009 market values recovered
somewhat, while thereafter they remained more or less stable. The graph in the mid-
dle of the ﬁgure shows the average spread on banks’ CDS-contracts. Spreads started
to increase from the second half of 2007 onwards, and spiked in September 2008 after
the collapse of Lehman Brothers. The graph in the bottom panel shows that also prob-
abilities of default were especially volatile around the Lehman collapse. The volatility
of default probabilities underlines that default risk is absent during normal times, but
6We calculate the weekly logarithmic returns as the sum of absolute daily logarithmic returns, where we
interpolate 0.25 percent of the daily observations to control for unexpectedly large changes in volatility (as
would result from sudden capital injections). The days for which we interpolated the data were selected as
those for which ﬁtting a GARCH(1,1)-model yielded the largest standardised residual.
7In the Appendix we show that this approach to calculate the distance to default yields results which are
highly similar to the original approach suggested by Crosbie and Bohn (2003).
8We select banks that are classiﬁed as Bank Holding & Holding Companies, Commercial Banks, Coopera-
tive Banks, Investment Banks, Real Estate/Mortgage Banks, and Savings Banks, with leverage D/(D + V)
at least equal to 0.85 by the end of 2006 (where D equals the book value of debt and V equals the market
value of the equity). We also keep Bank of America, whose leverage by the end of 2006 equals 0.847. We
limit the set of countries to the EU-15, Iceland, Norway, Switzerland, and the United States, and remove
banks from the sample for which shares were not actively traded during all trading days of January 2007.
Finally, we exclude Bank Austria Creditanstalt and Bayrische Hypo- und Vereinsbank (both part of Uni-
Credit), Banca Lombarda (part of UBI Banca), BHW Holding (part of Deutsche Postbank), Depfa bank (part
of Hypo Real Estate), Commerce Bancorp (part of TD bank), and Banca CR Firenze (largely owned by Intesa
Sanpaolo).Bank Contagion 81
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.82 Chapter 5
can become quite real during times of crisis. In general, although both start to in-
crease around mid-2007 and on several occasions peak simultaneously, the reported
default probabilities differ substantially from the observed CDS-spreads. The differ-
ences between both indicators probably reﬂect that they measure somewhat different
concepts, consider different time horizons, and are calculated for different samples of
banks. Moreover, Stulz (2010) shows that CDS-contracts are generally traded over the
counter instead of on public exchanges, so that data on these spreads are likely to be
somewhat noisy. Because of these differences we use both CDS-spreads and model-
based default probabilities in our regression analysis, as both are popular indicators of
default risk in the literature.
Table5.2reportsbivariatecorrelationsbetweenthevariablesincludedintheregres-
sion model. First, the top two rows show that the average correlation between changes
in a bank’s market value and changes in its CDS-spread is smaller than zero, while
correlation between changes in market values and changes in default probabilities is
close to zero. The difference between both could be due to the fact that for instance
changes in investor risk aversion drive market values and CDS-spreads in opposite
directions, while they do not directly affect the probability of default. Such changes in
risk aversion might cause us to overestimate any contagion effects, as these effects also
imply a negative correlation between market values and CDS-spreads. The next two
rows show that the correlation between changes in default probabilities and between
changes in CDS-spreads is generally low, so that collinearity between our default risk
variables is unlikely to be a problem. Finally, the last row shows that changes in de-
fault probabilities and CDS-spreads on average are virtually uncorrelated. Although
both measures are popular indicators of default risk, they apparently capture different
aspects thereof.
5.4 Results
5.4.1 Main results
Table 5.3 reports the results from estimating the regression model in Equations (5.3)
and (5.4). To facilitate the interpretation of the coefﬁcients, we divide each variable inBank Contagion 83
Figure 5.1. Cross-sectional averages of bank market values, CDS-spreads and proba-
bilities of default
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Table 5.2. Correlation between the regression variables
Minimum Average Maximum
Cor(yi,cdsi) -0.81 -0.32 0.04
Cor(yi, pi) -0.85 -0.02 0.68
Cor
 
cdsi,cdsj

-0.62 0.39 0.97
Cor
 
pi, pj

-0.71 0.12 1.00
Cor(pi,cdsi) -0.38 0.04 0.97
Note: yi, pi and cdsi denote the time series with changes in bank i’s market value, stock-price based default
probability, and CDS-spread.
the model by its standard deviation before estimating the regression, so that each coef-
ﬁcient indicates the regressor’s correlation with the dependent variable. This transfor-
mation avoids our coefﬁcient estimates from being predominantly driven by the large
banks in the sample, whose changes in market values would otherwise account for
a large part of the variation in the dependent variable. By doing so we focus on the
impact of contagion on the system of banks as a whole, rather than on a smaller subset
thereof.
The ﬁrst row in the top panel reports the results for the regression with CDS-
spreads as indicators of bank default risk. The ﬁrst entry shows that in the full sample
of banks, the cross-section average of the estimated constants an equals  0.04. The
next entry shows that these estimates are for only 7 percent of the banks signiﬁcantly
smaller than zero (at the ﬁve-percent level). The second pair of entries shows that the
common shock coefﬁcient on average equals 0.34, and is signiﬁcantly larger than zero
for 95 percent of the banks in the sample. Even though the banks in the sample are
fairly different from each other, common shocks are thus an important driving force of
changes in their market values. This result implies that changes in bank market values
are correlated amongst each other also when there is no contagion.
The entries in the next three columns of the table focus on the contagion effect, i.e.
the impact that changes in banks’ default risk have on other banks’ market values.
This impact turns out to be limited, as the average gm coefﬁcient is close to zero with
a value of  0.01. For 35 percent of the banks, the estimated contagion coefﬁcient isBank Contagion 85
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signiﬁcantly negative, while we ﬁnd signiﬁcantly positive coefﬁcients for 20 percent
of the banks examined. In these cases, the sign of the coefﬁcient estimate is opposite
to what would be predicted by the contagion hypothesis. The next column shows that
the R-squared of the regression equals 0.36. The last column reports the number of
observations included in the regression.
The results for the full sample indicate that banks’ exposure to the market factor is
much larger than their exposure to changes in each other’s default risk. To examine
this result in more detail, the next rows in the top panel of the table focus on the coef-
ﬁcient estimates for several sub-samples of banks. The second and third rows report
coefﬁcient estimates for sub-samples based on location, distinguishing between banks
located in the US and banks located in the EU. We expect banks in the same region to
be more exposed to common shocks than banks from different regions. In addition,
IMF (2009) argues that banks that are more interconnected are also more likely to suf-
fer from contagion when one of them goes bankrupt. To the extent that banks from the
same region are more interconnected, we expect contagion between them to be higher
as well.
The results show that banks that either are all from the US or are all from the EU
are indeed more exposed to common shocks. That is, the bn coefﬁcient estimated for
US banks using a US market factor equals 0.53 on average, while for the EU this value
equals 0.44. Both values are higher than the corresponding value of 0.34 estimated for
the full sample. This result also shows that the correlation between banks via the mar-
ketfactorisstrongerintheUSthanintheEU,illustratingthatEuropeismoreheteroge-
neous. The contagion coefﬁcient for both sub-samples is close to zero, equalling  0.04
for the US and  0.02 for the EU. In addition, the percentages of signiﬁcantly positive
and negative contagion coefﬁcients are comparable to those found for the full-sample
regression.
The last two rows in the top panel focus on sub-samples based on banks’ size. We
distinguish between the ﬁfty percent largest banks in the sample, included in the left
column of Table 5.1, and the ﬁfty percent smallest banks. Amongst others, IMF (2009)
argues that especially the failure of large banks has a contagious impact on other banks
in the system. The results in the table do not provide any evidence for such an effect:
the coefﬁcient estimates for the contagion effect are close to zero. For smaller banksBank Contagion 87
they are signiﬁcantly negative in 71 percent of the cases, but still the results strengthen
our ﬁnding that contagion effects are of only limited importance as driving forces of
banks’ market values.
A possible explanation for the rather small contagion effects in the regressions with
CDS-spreads, is that these spreads are inaccurate measures of banks’ default risk. To
examine this possibility in more detail, the lower panel in the table reports the regres-
sion results obtained when using changes in default probabilities inferred from stock
price data as indicators of banks’ default risk. While CDS-spreads are only available
for a sub-set of 55 banks, the stock market based default probabilities are available for
all 96 banks in the sample. The ﬁrst row of the panel shows that the common shock
coefﬁcient on average is higher than for the regression using CDS-spreads, indicating
that the CDS-spreads pick up some of the variation that should actually be attributed
to the market factor. The contagion coefﬁcient is still close to zero, and is signiﬁcantly
smaller than zero for only 25 percent of the banks in the sample. The R-squared of the
regression is about the same as the corresponding one in the top panel of the table.
The next rows in the table conﬁrm the results from the CDS-spread regressions.
The common shock coefﬁcients are higher than the estimates in the top panel., and
again suggest that larger banks are more homogeneous. This result is in line with the
intuition that larger (universal) banks tend to engage in a similar, diversiﬁed range of
activities, while smaller (specialised) banks tend to be more active in local niche mar-
kets (in line with the model in Chapter 2). On average, the contagion coefﬁcients for
all sub-samples are close to zero, and even exactly zero for US banks. The R-squared
values from the regressions are about the same as before.
We have shown that ﬁnancial markets expect the contagious impact from the de-
fault of an individual bank m to be fairly small, which holds both for regressions
using default probabilities as well as regressions using CDS-spreads as indicators of
bankruptcy risk, and for regressions focusing on sub-samples based on banks’ loca-
tion as well as size. Still, a caveat from the analysis is that we estimate coefﬁcients for
contagion from individual banks. While these coefﬁcients are close to zero, it could
be that the aggregate instability of the banking sector does have a negative impact on
banks’ market values. If such an effect exists, changes in banks’ market values are
driven by the common variation in banks’ default probabilities rather than by changes88 Chapter 5
in the default probabilities of individual banks. We examine this hypothesis by omit-
ting the individual default probabilities from the regression model in Equations (5.3)
and (5.4), and estimate the common market factor from changes in banks’ market val-
ues, i.e. without ﬁrst regressing these market values on bank default probabilities. The
difference between this new estimate of the market factor and the original one, is that
the new one also picks up any changes in banks’ market values due to contagion from
the aggregate instability of the banking sector. The average over all banks of the bm
coefﬁcient estimated for this new market factor equals 0.58, which is higher than the
original coefﬁcients of 0.34 and 0.43 reported in Table 5.3. At the same time, the R-
squared from the regression is 0.37, which is equal to the R-squareds from the original
regressions. Only the common variation in banks’ default probabilities has any power
in explaining changes in banks’ market values. As this common variation will how-
ever for an important part be driven by third factors such as changes in global investor
risk aversion, the correlation of this common variation with changes in banks’ market
values cannot be directly attributed to any contagion effects.
5.4.2 Lehman Brothers
Our ﬁnding that interbank contagion explains only a very limited amount of banks’
market value changes during the credit crisis seems to be at odds with the aftermath
of the Lehman Brothers default on 15 September 2008. After this date, counterparty
risk awareness spread through the ﬁnancial system, with quickly rising money market
interest rates as one of the results. While it seems only natural to conclude that this tur-
moil was caused by the default of Lehman Brothers, Taylor (2009) and Huertas (2010)
argue that it was triggered by markets’ uncertainty about the ability of governments
to bail-out troubled ﬁnancial institutions. Such safety nets play a large role in market
participants’ risk assessments, as was made explicit when Moody’s (2007) announced
that its future bank credit ratings would also incorporate the likelihood of a govern-
ment rescue operation in case of an imminent default. Consequently, Icelandic banks
received a ﬁve-step upgrade to a triple-A rating, which until then had been reserved
for only the most solvent of ﬁnancial institutions. The (threat of) removal of govern-
ment safety nets can thus have a substantial impact on the market value of ﬁnancialBank Contagion 89
intermediaries and on the interest rates against which they can borrow funds (see also
Standard & Poor’s 2011). Consequently, the aftermath of the Lehman default could
also be due to the common shock stemming from the signal by the US government
that defaulting large banks would not necessarily be rescued.
We obtain the individual b and g coefﬁcients for Lehman Brothers from the regres-
sions underlying the results in Table 5.3. Lehman’s correlation with the market factor
equals 0.20 for the regression with CDS-spreads and 0.53 for the regression with de-
fault probabilities, with both values being statistically signiﬁcant at the 5-percent level.
The contagion coefﬁcient is 0.11 for the regression with CDS-spreads and 0.12 for the
regression with default probabilities. Both are of the wrong sign, and as it turns out
signiﬁcantly so. These ﬁndings are in line with those reported in Table 5.3.
That market participants expected contagion from Lehman to be of minor impor-
tance could seem surprising at ﬁrst. This result however is consistent with the ob-
jectives of ﬁnancial regulation and supervision, which aims to minimise contagion
through for instance imposing limits on large exposures to individual counterparties
andinvestmentsinasingleassetclass, andalsorequiresthepostingofcollateraltomit-
igate counterparty credit risk. Concerning the aftermath of the Lehman bankruptcy,
BIS (2009, p.24) concludes that “Lehman-referencing CDS exposures turned out to be
smaller than feared. They eventually translated into relatively modest net settlement
payments of about USD 5.2 billion, which would be closed out without incident in late
October.” Our ﬁndings might also be due to market participants expecting govern-
ments to prevent the contagious fallout after any bank defaults. As discussed above
such expectations are unlikely to fully explain our results, but if so, this would be
evidence of widespread moral hazard amongst ﬁnancial market players.
5.5 Conclusion
Simultaneous defaults in the banking sector are often attributed to interbank conta-
gion, but can also be due to common shocks affecting banks with similar balance
sheets. We disentangle these two effects by examining whether ﬁnancial markets ex-
pected bank defaults to be contagious during the 2007–2009 Global Financial Crisis.
Our strategy to identify contagion is based on the presumption that if ﬁnancial mar-90 Chapter 5
kets expect one bank’s default to cause other banks to suffer losses as well, as implied
by the contagion hypothesis, an increase in this bank’s default probability should lead
to a decline in the other banks’ stock market valuations. For a global sample of the
one hundred largest banks, we test for contagion by regressing changes in banks’ mar-
ket values on changes in other banks’ CDS-spreads or default probabilities. While we
ﬁnd changes in market values to be correlated across banks through a common mar-
ket factor, a change in one bank’s CDS-spread or default probability hardly affects the
market’s valuation of any other banks in the sample.
Our ﬁndings suggests that ﬁnancial market participants expect contagion risk to
be of minor importance compared to the impact of common adverse shocks affecting
the banking sector as a whole. Whether these expectations are correct or not, the fact
thatcontagionriskdoesnotseemtobepricedimpliesthatthesimultaneousdeclinesin
banks’ market values have been primarily due to common shocks affecting banks with
similar exposures to the economic and political environment. Examples of such shocks
are a decline in U.S. house prices, a global recession, a change in monetary policy, or
a change in governments’ willingness to bailout troubled ﬁnancial institutions. While
ﬁnancial market dynamics such as herding can amplify the impact of such shocks on
the ﬁnancial system, our results show that these shocks or the ampliﬁcation thereof
are not driven by changes in the default risk of individual banks. This ﬁnding is in
line with earlier literature showing that common shocks rather than contagion are the
main drivers of banking sector instability.Bank Contagion 91
5.A Appendix
Crosbie and Bohn (2003) show that a bank’s probability of default PD can be calculated
as
PD = N ( DD) = N
 
 
ln(VA/D) +
 
m   0.5s2
A

T
sA
p
T
!
, (5.6)
where N () denotes the standard normal cumulative probability distribution. The
probability of default is a function of the distance to default DD, which indicates the
expected number of standard deviations that the bank is away from the point where
its asset value is insufﬁcient to cover its liabilities at the time these become due. This
distance is a function of the market value of the bank’s assets VA, the expected return
on assets m, this return’s standard deviation sA, the book value of debt D, and this
debt’s maturity T. To obtain the market value of assets, Crosbie and Bohn (2003) use
the option pricing framework of Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974), which
links VA to the market value of equity V as
V = VAN (d1)   e rTDN

d1   sA
p
T

, (5.7)
with d1 =
ln(VA/D)+(r+0.5s2
A)T
sA
p
T and r being the risk-free interest rate. The standard
deviation of expected future asset returns sA can be related to the standard deviation
of expected future equity returns s via
s =
VA
V
N (d1)sA. (5.8)
While it provides an internally consistent approach to derive the probability of de-
fault PD, solving the above system of Equations (5.6)-(5.8) requires data on D, T, r,
and m, which are notoriously difﬁcult to obtain especially on a high-frequency basis
(we cannot use ex-post statistics since market participants did not have these available
when they engaged in the trading decisions leading to the observed values for V and
s). Book values of debt D are only reported once a year in banks’ annual reports, and
are generally not itemised to different maturities T. In practice, D is often set equal
to the sum of interpolated short-term debt and ﬁfty percent of interpolated long-term
debt, while it is assumed that this total amount has a homogeneous maturity structure92 Chapter 5
T of one year. Risk-free interest rates r only exist in theory and are often approximated
by the return on U.S. Treasury Bills, whereas expected future asset returns m are con-
structed by extrapolating historical asset returns using a moving average of several
months (see for instance Vassalou and Xing 2004, Dufﬁe, Saita, and Wang 2007). These
approximations are quite crude, and are unlikely to reﬂect the actual beliefs of market
participants regarding for instance the risk-free interest rate during crisis interven-
tions by the Federal Reserve, or the debt maturity structure and future asset returns of
Lehman Brothers’ just before this institution went bankrupt.
In light of these data limitations, we follow Bystr¨ om (2006) and use stock market
data to calculate the distance to default as DD = 1/s. We estimate s as the forecast
from a GARCH model ﬁtted to the time series of logarithmic equity returns. Bystr¨ om
(2006) ﬁnds that this measure is equal to the distance to default implied by Credit-
Grades, a structural model to calculate credit spreads that was introduced by the risk
management ﬁrm RiskMetrics in 2002, and was endorsed by Deutsche Bank, Goldman
Sachs, and JP Morgan. Moreover, he shows that especially for highly levered ﬁrms
such as banks, 1/s closely approximates the distance to default in Equation (5.6). As
our approximation has the same z score functional form as the original distance to
default, which Bharath and Shumway (2008) show is the main driving force behind
this measure’s ability to forecast actual bankruptcies, we can map it to the standard
normal distribution to obtain the default probability PD. Figure 5.2 shows that the
resulting probabilities of default are similar to the ones implied by Equation (5.6).9
9We calculate the Merton (1974) distance to default using the same approach as Vassalou and Xing (2004)
and Dufﬁe, Saita, and Wang (2007), setting D equal to short-term debt and ﬁfty percent of long-term debt
(obtained from Datastream and interpolated to a weekly frequency), setting r equal to the return on U.S.
Treasury Bills obtained from the Federal Reserve Board, and calculating m as the six-month moving average
of logarithmic asset returns. For equity volatility s we use the GARCH estimates discussed above.Bank Contagion 93
Figure 5.2. Cross-sectional averages of probabilities of default based on Bystr¨ om (2006)
and on Crosbie and Bohn (2003)
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* This chapter is based on Mink and de Haan (2012).96 Chapter 6
6.1 Introduction
In the course of 2010, the ﬁnancial problems of Greece became so severe that the euro
countries agreed to provide bilateral loans for a total amount of EUR 80 billion to be
disbursed over the period May 2010 through June 2013. In addition, the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) ﬁnanced EUR 30 billion under a stand-by arrangement. An im-
portant motivation to provide ﬁnancial support to Greece despite the no-bailout clause
in the Maastricht Treaty was fear of contagion, see for instance ECB Vice-president
Constˆ ancio (2011). It was feared that a restructuring of Greek debt could lead to a new
banking crisis in the EU as several banks, notably in France and Germany, had a high
exposure to Greece. In addition, policymakers were afraid that a Greek default would
spill over to other highly indebted countries in the euro area.
The threat of contagion from a sovereign default is however not undisputed. Ac-
cording to Cochrane (2010), “we’re told that a Greek default will threaten the ﬁnancial
system. But how? Greece has no millions of complex swap contracts, no obscure
derivatives, no intertwined counterparties. Greece is not a brokerage or a market-
maker. There isn’t even any collateral to dispute or assets to seize. This isn’t new ﬁ-
nance, it’s plain-vanilla sovereign debt, a game that has been going on since the Medici
started lending money to Popes in the 1400s. People who lent money will lose some of
it. Period.” With respect to a Greek default spilling over to other countries, Cochrane
argues “we’re told that a Greek default will lead to ‘contagion.’ The only thing an in-
vestor learns about Portuguese, Spanish, and Italian ﬁnances from a Greek default is
whether the EU will or won’t bail them out too. Any ‘contagion’ here is entirely self-
inﬂicted. If everyone knew there wouldn’t be bailouts there would be no contagion.”
The argument by Cochrane (2010) closely resembles the main message from re-
search by Aharony and Swary (1983). These authors perform an event study to exam-
ine contagion to other banks when alarge bank goes bankrupt. Their analysis indicates
that “when the failure of a large bank is caused primarily by problems speciﬁc to the
bank, suchasfraud, nocontagioneffectsareobserved. Whenthefailureofalargebank
is caused by problems whose revelation is correlated across banks, the observed fall in
prices of solvent bank stocks may be interpreted as investors’ response to a common
type of unfavourable signal, rather than a contagion effect” (p. 305). In the context ofCountry Contagion 97
a Greek sovereign default, this ‘unfavourable signal’ would be the revelation that euro
area governments apparently are not willing to shield private investors from losses
anymore when countries are about to default on their debt obligations.
There is, as yet, surprisingly limited research on contagion in the current euro area
debt crisis.1 To identify contagion it is necessary to identify a country-speciﬁc event
that affects asset prices other than the sovereign bond price of the country concerned.
We adopt the standard event study approach reviewed by MacKinlay (1997) and used
in earlier work on contagion by, for instance, Aharony and Swary (1983), Kho, Lee,
and Stulz (2000) and Brewer III, Genay, Hunter, and Kaufman (2003). As an inno-
vation to this approach, we identify the events as the trading days in 2010 with the
largest volatility in yields on Greek government bonds and relate those days to the
‘news’ that caused these ﬂuctuations. This approach circumvents a major problem
of event studies, which for sovereign rating changes was most recently illustrated by
Michaelidis, Milidonis, Nishiotis, and Papakyriacou (2012), namely how to identify
major event days during which there is really an event that is not expected (and there-
fore not priced in). The news reports, taken from Reuters, were classiﬁed into two
categories: news about Greek public ﬁnances and news about the willingness (or lack
thereof) of European countries to provide ﬁnancial support to Greece. This way we can
distinguish between market reactions due to fears of contagion from a Greek default
and reactions reﬂecting moral hazard caused by the prospect of a sovereign bailout.
In the empirical analysis, we start with examining the impact of news about Greece
and its potential bailout on bank stock prices. As pointed out by Davies and Ng (2011),
there are several channels through which deteriorating sovereign creditworthiness
may affect banks.2 First, increases in sovereign risk cause losses on banks’ govern-
1Exceptions include Arezki, Candelon, and Sy (2011), Missio and Watzka (2011), Afonso, Furceri, and
Gomes (2011) and De Santis (2012). Arezki, Candelon, and Sy (2011) examine the spillover effects of
sovereign rating news on European ﬁnancial markets during the period 2007–2010. They ﬁnd that sovereign
rating downgrades have statistically and economically signiﬁcant spillover effects both across countries and
ﬁnancial markets. Downgrades to near speculative grade ratings for economies such as Greece have a sys-
tematic spillover effect across euro area countries. Missio and Watzka (2011) use a dynamic conditional
correlation model (DCC) to study contagion in the euro area. Their results show that Portuguese, Spanish,
Italian and Belgian yield spreads increase along with their Greek counterpart. Afonso, Furceri, and Gomes
(2011) examine whether sovereign yields and CDS spreads in a given country react to rating announcements
of other countries. They conclude that there is evidence of contagion, especially from lower rated countries
to higher rated countries. Finally, De Santis (2012) shows sovereign bond spreads in the euro area can be
decomposed into i) aggregate regional risk, ii) country-speciﬁc credit risk, and iii) spillovers from Greece.
2Acharya, Drechsler, and Schnabel (2011) ﬁnd that after several bank bailouts in 2008, bank CDS spreads
declined across all countries with a corresponding increase in sovereign CDS spreads, suggesting a transfer98 Chapter 6
ment bond holdings, thereby weakening their balance sheets. This holds, of course,
for Greek banks that have a large exposure to the Greek government, but also banks
outside Greece hold signiﬁcant quantities of Greek debt. Second, a fall in the market
price of Greek sovereign bonds reduces the value of the collateral that banks can use
to secure wholesale funding, and can trigger margin calls from counterparties. Third,
deteriorating creditworthiness of Greece may reduce the value of government guaran-
tees to Greek banks, be they explicit or perceived. Finally, sovereign downgrades often
ﬂow through to lower ratings for domestic banks because banks are more likely than
other sectors to be affected by sovereign distress. The extent to which these channels
affect bank stock prices depends on whether markets believe that other EU countries
will support Greece. It was widely believed that other euro area countries would sup-
port Greece so as to avoid any contagion effects, despite the no-bailout clause of the
Maastricht Treaty. If certain statements by leading European politicians cast doubt on
such a bailout, however, bond prices of other sovereigns might be also affected. That
is why we also examine whether Greek news affects bond prices of other highly in-
debted countries in the euro area. Increasing doubts about a general bailout would
also make the last two of the above channels effective outside Greece. In our empirical
analysis we therefore not only take banks’ exposure to Greece into account, but also
their exposure to other highly indebted euro area countries.
Using data for 48 European banks, our ﬁndings suggest that only news about the
Greekbailouthasasigniﬁcanteffectonbankstockprices, evenonstockpricesofbanks
without any exposure to Greece or other highly indebted euro area countries. News
about the economic situation in Greece does not lead to abnormal returns. These re-
sults are similar to the ones by Aharony and Swary (1983) and provide some support
for Cochrane’s (2010) argument. However, we also ﬁnd that the price of sovereign
debt of Portugal, Ireland, and Spain responds to both news about Greece and news
about a Greek bailout. Still, the ﬁnding that news about the economic situation in
Greece affects sovereign bond yields of other highly indebted countries does not nec-
essarily imply contagion as it is also in line with the so-called ‘wake-up call’ view.
of default risk from the banking sector to the sovereign. However, thereafter both spreads increased together
while the sovereign spread increase was larger for countries whose ﬁnancial sectors were more distressed
(see also Ejsing and Lemke 2011). In view of the large exposure of the banking sector to these sovereigns,
the rise of sovereign CDS spreads has led to fears of a renewed banking crisis in the euro area.Country Contagion 99
According to this view a crisis initially restricted to one country may provide new in-
formation prompting investors to reassess the vulnerability of other countries, which
spreads the crisis across borders (see, for instance Bekaert, Ehrmann, Fratzscher, and
Mehl 2011).
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 6.2 outlines our
method, while Section 6.3 describes the data used. Section 6.4 presents the estimation
results and robustness analyses. The ﬁnal section concludes.
6.2 Method
We adopt an event study approach as is commonly used in ﬁnance (see MacKinlay
1997). In particular, we estimate a regression equation similar to the one used by Kho,
Lee, and Stulz (2000) and Brewer III, Genay, Hunter, and Kaufman (2003), which for
time t reads
Rpt = a + bRmt +
J
å
j=1
gjDG
jt +
K
å
k=1
dkDB
kt + et, (6.1)
where Rpt is the bank portfolio’s daily excess return (i.e. the return minus the risk-free
rate), Rmt is the excess return on the market portfolio, the event dummies DG
t and DB
t
indicate trading days during which there was news about Greece and, respectively,
news about the willingness of other countries to bailout Greece. As a result, the abnor-
mal returns associated with these events are given by the gj and dk coefﬁcients.
Our estimation window runs from the start to the end of 2010. A common difﬁculty
in event studies is how to select the individual event dates in this window, and how
to be certain that the news during these days was not anticipated and thus priced
in by ﬁnancial markets already during earlier days. We circumvent this problem by
taking as our event dates the twenty trading days in 2010 during which the 10-year
Greek government bonds experienced the largest price changes. These are the days
during which markets priced in the largest news developments. We classify this news
as news about Greece, to construct the DG
jt dummy variable, or as news about the
likelihood that Greece will be bailed out by other European countries, to construct the
DB
jt dummy variable. We obtain our news information from the Reuters U.K. archive of
high-frequency news messages. Table 6.1 reports the selected event dates and the type100 Chapter 6
of news that was most prominent during these days . The table shows that the changes
in bond price ﬂuctuations on the event days range from 2.6 to 32 percent in absolute
value, which is large by conventional standards (the standard deviation of bond prices
changes over the preceding year equals 0.6 percent). By using this approach to select
our event dates, we avoid arbitrary judgement about which days to select as the date of
an event, and also need not worry about whether news during these days was already
priced in by the markets before.3
The aim of our analysis is to examine the overall impact of news about Greece and
of news about Greece’s bailout, and compare the impact of both types of news on bank
stock prices. This way we can distinguish the impact of ﬁscal instability in Greece on
bank market values from the impact of politicians’ willingness to provide ﬁnancial
support to Greece. To facilitate doing so, we modify Equation (6.1) by omitting the
twenty news dummies, and instead include one variable NG
t for news about Greece,
and one variable NB
t for news about the bailout. We construct these variables such that
NG
t = å
J
j=1 DG
jtRgt and NB
t = å
K
k=1 DB
ktRgt, where Rgt denotes the change in the price
of the 10-year Greek government bonds. As a result, the coefﬁcient estimates for these
variables, which we refer to as g and d respectively, can be interpreted as the abnormal
return associated with a 1 percentage point change in the value of Greek government
debt.
6.3 Data
We select the portfolio of banks using the stress tests performed by the Committee
of European Bank Supervisors in July 2010. These stress test aimed at assessing the
resilience of the EU banking system to possible adverse economic developments, and
include a representative sample of 91 European banks which account for 65 percent
of the European market in terms of total assets, see CEBS (2010). We use all banks
3Wehavetomakeasubjectivejudgementaboutattributingﬂuctuationsinbondpricesduringthosedaysto
the two categories of news events that we distinguish. Fair (2002) shows that the news driving even extreme
price ﬂuctuations is not always easy to identify. However, in the current analysis this issue is somewhat
mitigated by the fact that we only have to establish whether or not during an event day there was news
about the bailout. If not, we automatically consider the news event as referring to the economic situation in
Greece, without the need to precisely pin down the reason for the change in the Greek bond price. Still, we
examine the robustness of our classiﬁcation in the empirical section by identifying event dates using Greek
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Table 6.1. Events inferred from changes in Greek government bond prices.
Event date News description Bailout Return
27-01-2010 Greece on Wednesday denied press reports it had chosen Goldman Sachs to
sell up to 25 billion euros of bonds to China, sending Greek government debt
prices sharply lower and hitting the euro.
No -3.50
28-01-2010 Germany and France denied a media report that they were planning to give
ﬁnancial aid to Greece, whose budget deﬁcit hit an estimated 12.7 percent in
2009. Athens says it is seeking funds only through the markets, mainly in
Europe.
Yes -3.10
10-02-2010 European shares rose on Wednesday on hopes of a possible European Union
rescue plan for Greece.
Yes 2.63
06-04-2010 Markets pushed Greece’s risk premium to a euro lifetime high amid growing
doubts over the country’s capacity to resolve its debt crisis and fresh scepti-
cism about a European Union-International Monetary Fund aid mechanism.
No -3.17
12-04-2010 The euro zone agreed on a 30-billion-euro package of three-year loans at inter-
est of about 5 percent if Greece seeks help. The International Monetary Fund
would also be expected to supply 15 billion euros in the ﬁrst year.
Yes 3.35
23-04-2010 Greek bank shares erased gains posted earlier in the day on concerns over
possible delays in the activation of an EU/IMF aid package.
Yes -3.04
26-04-2010 Germany said on Monday it could offer aid for Greece within days if it agreed
to painful new austerity measures, but rescue jitters pushed the cost of insur-
ing against a Greek debt default to a record high.
Yes -5.50
03-05-2010 Markets reacted to a record 110 billion euro bailout for Greece, although in-
vestors doubted it would offer more than temporary relief to a euro zone
shaken by divisions and saddled with high debt.
Yes 4.17
04-05-2010 Doubts whether debt-stricken Greece has the resolve to make sharp spending
cuts fuelled safe-haven demand for bonds.
No -6.26
05-05-2010 Fear that a euro-zone debt crisis may spread beyond Greece knocked the euro
below the $1.29 level for the ﬁrst time in more than a year on Wednesday and
rattled bond markets in Portugal and Spain as anxious investors snapped up
U.S. dollars.
No -5.74
06-05-2010 Investors rushed to the perceived safety of the U.S. dollar and Japanese yen
as the European Central Bank offered no new measures to ease a Greek debt
crisis after a meeting earlier the day.
Yes -2.86
07-05-2010 Greece’s drastic belt-tightening to secure emergency aid risks plunging the
economy into a deeper recession, threatening delivery of key ﬁscal targets and
prolonging the debt crisis.
No -10.59
10-05-2010 Investor sentiment receives a boost from news of an European Union plan to
halt the spread of Greece’s ﬁscal woes.
Yes 31.97
14-05-2010 European bank shares fell over 3 percent on Friday as renewed concerns about
losses from exposures to Greece unsettled investors.
No -4.08
18-05-2010 Greece received a 14.5 billion euro loan from the European Union and can
now repay its immediate debt, a development that helped to steady global
investor’s jitters.
Yes 4.01
15-06-2010 A recovery in stocks and the euro ﬁzzled out after Moody’s downgraded
Greece to junk status.
No -5.82
23-06-2010 Communist trade unionists blocked travellers from boarding ships at Greece’s
largest port on Wednesday, stranding tourist ferries as part of protests against
austerity measures in the debt-choked nation.
No -3.42
11-10-2010 The International Monetary Fund said on Sunday that bailout loans to Greece
could be stretched out or replaced if reﬁnancing worries lingered in markets,
but it currently has no concrete plans to do so.
Yes 3.47
27-10-2010 Greece’s 2009 budget deﬁcit, whose wildly gyrating ﬁgures triggered the
country’s ﬁscal crisis, will be set ”once and for all” at above 15 percent of
GDP, the ﬁnance minister said.
No -4.51
04-11-2010 Greece resumes air freight after parcel bomb spate. Greek authorities have
blamed leftist militants for the bombs, which may be intended to spur an anti-
government vote in Sunday’s local elections in protest against austerity plans.
No -2.66102 Chapter 6
included in the stress test for which Thomson Datastream reports a stock price quote
during at least 90 percent of the 261 trading days in 2010, which results in a sample of
48 banks. These banks and their exposures to Greece and three other highly indebted
countries, i.e. Ireland, Portugal, and Spain (GIPS-countries), are listed in Table 6.2.
The table shows that there is quite some heterogeneity in the sample with respect to
the exposures of individual banks, which range from 0 to 417 percent of their core tier
1 capital buffers.
For the banks in the table we obtain from Thomson Datastream daily time series for
2010 with market capitalisation expressed in local currencies (see Chapter 3). To con-
struct the returns on the bank portfolios that are included as the dependent variable
in Equation (6.1), we use these time series to construct ﬁve portfolios with logarith-
mic changes in market capitalisation averaged over: (i) all banks, (ii) all banks with an
exposure to Greece, (iii) all banks without an exposure to Greece, (iv) all banks with
an exposure to at least one of the four GIPS-countries, and (v) all banks without an
exposure to any of the GIPS-countries.4 In addition to focusing on the impact of Greek
news on bank portfolios, we analyse the impact of news on bond prices of Ireland, Por-
tugal, and Spain. To this end, we use as the dependent variable Thomson Datastream
price changes of these countries’ 10-year government bonds.
When analysing abnormal returns on the portfolios of bank equity we use the re-
turn on the FTSEuroﬁrst 300 index as the market index. When analysing the impact on
sovereign bond prices we use as the market index the J.P. Morgan Index of European
Government Bonds with yields to maturity between 7 and 10 years. We express the
returns on bank portfolios, government bonds, and stock and bond price indices in
excess of the risk-free rate, for which we take the one-day EONIA interest rate.
4By focusing on the impact of news on the price of bank stocks rather than on the price of bank bonds,
we aim to avoid that our results are affected by government guarantees for banks that are considered to
be ‘systemically important’. While these guarantees would reduce the response of bank bond prices to any
contagion effects, they are not designed to protect shareholders whose capital is designed to bear losses. See
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Table 6.2. Banks included in the sample.
Exposure in % of core tier 1 capital
Bank name Country to Greece to GIPS
Austria Erste Group Bank 6.58 11.88
Raiffeisen Zentralbank Oesterreich 0.22 0.31
Belgium Dexia 21.33 48.57
KBC Bank 6.76 24.01
Cyprus Bank of Cyprus 74.77 88.83
Marﬁn Popular Bank 122.07 126.34
Denmark Danske Bank 0.00 4.45
Jyske Bank 5.06 6.44
Sydbank 0.00 0.00
Finland Op-Pohjola 0.40 1.19
France BNP Paribas 7.96 17.66
Credit Agricole 1.63 10.58
Soci´ et´ e G´ en´ erale 12.18 17.28
Germany Commerzbank 9.82 25.74
Deutsche Bank 4.89 12.80
Deutsche Postbank 27.25 58.56
Greece Alpha Bank 85.64 85.64
EFG Eurobank Ergasias 139.43 139.43
National Bank of Greece 260.29 260.29
TT Hellenic Postbank 417.18 417.18
Hungary FTB Mortgage Bank 0.00 0.00
OTP Bank 0.00 0.00
Ireland Allied Irish Banks 0.48 56.49
Bank of Ireland 0.00 12.39
Italy Banco Popolare 1.25 3.37
Intesa Sanpaolo 2.74 5.18
Monte dei Paschi di Siena 0.38 2.72
UBI Banca 0.37 0.37
Unicredit 2.05 4.17
Netherlands ING Bank 7.13 16.25
SNS Bank 3.54 17.25
Poland PKO Bank Polski 0.00 0.00
Portugal Banco BPI 22.67 232.22
Banco Comercial Portugues 11.77 30.66
Spain Banco de Sabadell 0.00 95.45
Banco Pastor 2.03 144.28
Banco Popular Espa˜ nol 0.00 97.33
Bankinter 0.00 75.73
Grupo BBVA 1.08 194.78
Grupo Santander 0.54 95.84
Sweden Nordea 1.27 1.46
Swedbank 0.00 0.00
Svenska Handelsbanken 0.00 0.00
Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken 1.51 3.02
United Kingdom Barclays 0.78 11.99
HSBC 1.58 2.91
Lloyds Bancking Group 0.00 0.30
Royal Bank of Scotland 3.20 12.35104 Chapter 6
6.4 Results
6.4.1 Main results
The fear for contagion by policy makers is easy to understand once taking a quick
look at the raw data. Of the twenty days with extreme returns on Greek sovereign
bonds, the average bank experienced a return equal to 3.26 percent when the news
was positive, and  1.62 percent when the news was negative. Hence, it is easy to
conclude from these casual observations that bank stock prices are strongly driven by
the risk that Greece might go bankrupt.
Table 6.3 reports the abnormal returns for news about Greece and news about the
bailout of Greece. They are obtained as the coefﬁcient estimates from regressing the
time series of daily portfolio returns during 2010 on the news variables (as well as on
a constant and the market index). Two observations stand out from the ﬁrst row in the
table. First, news about the economic situation of Greece does not have a signiﬁcant
impact on the market value of the equity portfolio including all banks in the sample.
Second, news about the bailout of Greece does signiﬁcantly affect the market value of
this portfolio. A one percent change in the Greek government bond price induced by
news about a bailout leads to a 0.12 percent change in banks’ market value.
The ﬁrst ﬁnding implies that expectations by ﬁnancial markets regarding losses for
banks do not change when the probability of a Greek default changes due to news
about Greece’s economic situation. This includes losses expected from direct expo-
sures to Greece, but also losses expected from indirect exposures via other banks. This
result suggests that market participants do not expect bank losses associated with an
actual Greek default to be large in magnitude.
The second ﬁnding implies that the prospect of a bailout has a stabilising impact
on bank stock prices. When Greek bonds rise in value due to positive news about a
bailout, bank stock prices rise as well (and vice versa). Apparently, ﬁnancial markets
attachasubstantialvaluetothewillingnessofgovernmentstoshieldbanksfromlosses
on their sovereign exposures by bailing out failing euro countries.
To examine the impact of news about Greece and news about a Greek bailout in
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Table 6.3. Impact of bond-based news about Greece and about the bailout of Greece on
bank equity and sovereign bonds
Regression equation: Rpt = a + bRmt + gNG
gt + dNB
gt + et
News about Greece News about the bailout
g t stat. d t stat.
Abnormal return on bank equity
All banks 0.016 0.23 0.124 9.45
Banks exposed to Greece 0.017 0.23 0.132 9.41
Banks not exposed to Greece 0.012 0.18 0.101 4.62
Banks exposed to GIPS 0.016 0.21 0.132 9.15
Banks not exposed to GIPS 0.015 0.25 0.072 3.63
Abnormal return on sovereign bonds
Portugal 0.214 3.51 0.282 30.40
Ireland 0.160 2.79 0.234 20.61
Spain 0.052 1.96 0.113 24.64
Reported t statistics are calculated from Newey-West standard errors.
Greece from banks without an exposure to Greece. The results do not differ qualita-
tively from those for the average sample of banks, as news about the economic sit-
uation of Greece never leads to signiﬁcant abnormal returns, while news about the
bailout of Greece always leads to such abnormal returns. As the table shows, even
banks without an exposure to Greece respond to news about Greece’s bailout. The next
two rows consider banks with or without an exposure to any of the GIPS-countries.
The results conﬁrm the previous results: banks with an exposure to any of the GIPS-
countries do not respond to news about Greece, while even banks without such an
exposure respond to news about the bailout. Our ﬁnding that news about Greece does
not have an impact on bank stock prices while news about a bailout does, suggests that
markets consider news about the bailout to be a signal of European governments’ will-
ingness in general to use public funds to protect private investors against losses. When
governments indicate, for instance, that they will not rescue Greece, markets consider
this to be a disturbing signal mainly because it might imply governments also will not
engage in any other ﬁnancial sector rescue operations anymore.
The last three rows of the table examine to what extent the prices of sovereign debt
of the other three GIPS-countries, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain, respond to news about106 Chapter 6
the economic situation in Greece and news about a Greek bailout. In this case we do
ﬁnd signiﬁcant abnormal returns associated with news about the economic situation in
Greece, while as before news about the bailout leads to abnormal returns as well. The
t statistics for news about the bailout are a factor ten larger than those for news about
Greece itself, although results from a Wald-test show the absolute returns of both types
of news are not statistically different from each other.
That news about the bailout leads to abnormal returns in other countries as well
is not surprising, as the willingness of euro countries to bailout Greece obviously says
a lot about their willingness to bailout other GIPS-countries as well. However, that
news about the economic situation in Greece leads to abnormal returns on other coun-
tries’ bond prices might be more surprising, as it does not lead to abnormal returns
on bank stock prices (including the sub-sample with an exposure to the GIPS). An
explanation for the impact of news about Greece on other countries is that there is a
learning effect. Others refer to this as a ‘wake-up call’: a crisis initially restricted to one
country may provide new information prompting investors to reassess the vulnerabil-
ity of other countries, which spreads the crisis across borders (Goldstein, Kaminsky
and Reinhart, 2000). According to this view, domestic fundamentals are likely to play
a dominant role in the transmission of the crisis (Bekaert, Ehrmann, Fratzscher and
Mehl, 2011). The ability of Greece to reduce its budget deﬁcit and government debt,
and the response of rating agencies to these attempts, are quite informative about the
likelihood that other indebted countries will be able to quickly reduce their debt levels
as well. If Greece does not succeed to credibly commit to a sustainable ﬁscal policy, the
probability that other GIPS-countries will manage to do so may be small as well. Our
results suggest that the abnormal returns in GIPS-countries after news about Greece’s
economic situation are especially due to such learning effects.
6.4.2 Robustness analyses
As a robustness analysis, we use changes in Greek 10-year senior sovereign CDS-
spreads to identify event dates, instead of changes in Greek sovereign bond prices.
This way we examine the robustness of our results to using a different measure of
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Table 6.4. Impact of CDS-based news about Greece and about the bailout of Greece on
bank equity and sovereign CDS-spreads
Regression equation: Rpt = a + bRmt + gNG
gt + dNB
gt + et
News about Greece News about the bailout
g t stat. d t stat.
Abnormal return on bank equity
All banks -0.203 -0.92 -1.165 -7.00
Banks exposed to Greece -0.217 -0.89 -1.197 -7.26
Banks not exposed to Greece -0.160 -0.47 -1.068 -5.14
Banks exposed to GIPS -0.229 -1.01 -1.209 -6.74
Banks not exposed to GIPS -0.021 -0.06 -0.854 -6.14
Abnormal return on sovereign bonds
Portugal 0.180 2.97 0.367 4.72
Ireland 0.070 1.62 0.129 3.39
Spain 0.088 3.02 0.130 4.18
Reported t statistics are calculated from Newey-West standard errors.
differ in several cases from the days with extreme returns in sovereign bond prices,
while sometimes there seems to be no clear news driving the event, we this way ex-
amine the robustness of our results to the identiﬁcation and classiﬁcation of the news
events. All CDS-spreads are obtained from Thomson Datastream. Table 6.4 shows
the outcomes. The results are similar to the ones presented above, as for banks news
about Greece does not lead to abnormal returns while news about the bailout does.5
Interestingly, for all bank portfolios the coefﬁcients for news about Greece and news
about a bailout are now signiﬁcantly different from each other. Abnormal returns in
countries’ CDS-spreads, which we use as the dependent variable instead of changes in
bond prices, are signiﬁcant as well for both types of news (although for Ireland only at
the ten percent level). These results conﬁrm those from our main analysis.
We also perform a robustness analysis where we include additional news variables
for events where the news is negative, i.e. for those days where the Greek bond price
declines. This way we examine whether investors respond asymmetrically to news
events. Neither for bank portfolios nor for government bonds is there evidence for
5The signs of the values in the table are opposite to the signs in Table 6.3, since when default risk increases
CDS-spreads rise while bond prices decline.108 Chapter 6
such an asymmetric response.
Finally, we do a robustness analysis where we construct a weighted average port-
folio of bank equity returns, using as weights the exposure to Greece as a percentage
of their core tier 1 equity buffers. As these exposures are likely to change over time
instead of being equal to the values in Table 6.2 throughout the entire sample period,
we do this exercise for robustness only. The results show that both types of news have
a signiﬁcant impact on the weighted portfolio, although for news about Greece only
at the ten percent level. However, once we remove the four banks for which the expo-
sure was larger than 100 percent of their equity, of which three are Greek and one is
from Cyprus, only news about the bailout has a signiﬁcant impact. When we construct
weighted portfolios with weights equal to the combined exposure to the GIPS as a per-
centage of core tier 1 equity, the results conﬁrm the ﬁnding from our main analysis that
only news about the bailout has a signiﬁcant impact.
6.5 Conclusion
Using an event study approach, we examine the impact of news about Greece and
news about a Greek bailout on bank stock prices in 2010 using data for 48 European
banks. We ﬁrst identify the twenty days with extreme returns on Greek sovereign
bonds and categorise the news events during those days into news about Greece and
news about the prospects of a Greek bailout. Our ﬁndings suggest that only news
about a bailout has a signiﬁcant effect on bank stock prices, even on stock prices of
banks without any exposure to Greece or other highly indebted euro area countries.
News about the economic situation in Greece does not lead to abnormal returns. This
combination of results suggest that ﬁnancial markets consider news about the bailout
to be a signal of European governments’ willingness in general to use public funds to
combat the ﬁnancial crisis. In contrast, the price of sovereign debt of Portugal, Ireland,
and Spain, responds to both news about the economic situation of Greece and news
about a Greek bailout. A plausible explanation for the impact of news about Greece on
the bond prices of other countries is that there is a ‘wake-up call’: a crisis initially re-
stricted to one country may provide new information prompting investors to reassess
the vulnerability of other countries, which spreads the crisis across borders.Chapter 7
Conclusion and Policy
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This thesis focused on the question to what extent simultaneous instability across
ﬁnancial markets or institutions is due to contagion, and to what extent it is due to
adverse common shocks. The difference between both concepts is important from an
academic as well as a policy perspective. While in case of contagion, instability of one
market or institution causes the instability of another, in case of a common shock, mar-
kets or institutions simultaneously become unstable due to a third factor such as an
increase in global investor risk aversion. Both effects are difﬁcult to disentangle em-
pirically, the key issue being that controlling for common shocks is not straightforward
as they often cannot directly be observed. Nonetheless, policy makers and the public
at large generally consider ﬁnancial contagion to be the obvious culprit once ﬁnancial
markets or institutions become unstable simultaneously.
Chapter 2 focused on the banking sector to point out that this explanation is less
obvious than it might seem at ﬁrst sight, and developed a theoretical model to show
howcommonshocks canbeanimportantreason forbanksbecomingunstablesimulta-
neously. The model shows that the supply of illiquidity insurance through the Lender
of Last Resort stimulates banks to take risks in such a manner that their balance sheets
become highly similar. First, the Lender of Last Resort causes bank funding struc-
tures to become more homogeneous, with all banks increasing their leverage and their
use of relatively short-term funds. Second, the Lender of Last Resort causes bank
asset portfolios to become highly correlated amongst each other, as the prospect of
receiving liquidity support stimulates banks to diversify rather than specialise in ac-
tivities. Through both effects, the provision of illiquidity insurance causes banks’ bal-
ance sheets to become increasingly similar and, consequently, more exposed to ad-
verse common shocks. This exposure provides an explanation additional to the con-
tagion hypothesis for the simultaneous occurrence of bank failures. The model shows
that regulatory capital requirements can actually stimulate diversiﬁcation, increasing
banks’ exposure to common shocks, while regulatory liquidity requirements reduce
all forms of bank risk-taking examined.
Chapter 3 provided an overview of common deﬁnitions of contagion in the empir-
ical literature, and then showed that part of the literature on stock market contagion
is biased towards ﬁnding evidence for contagion, as it focuses on stock market returns
expressed in US dollars instead of in local currencies. By doing so, ﬂuctuations in theConclusion 111
US dollar exchange rate effectively act as a common driving force behind the returns
on the examined markets, creating the impression of contagion between them where
in reality there is none.
Chapter 4 examined the common practice to empirically analyse contagion be-
tween stock markets by reporting results for co-movement with a predeﬁned ‘source’
market and during a predeﬁned ‘crisis’ period or quantile (i.e. a set of extreme returns
exceeding a given threshold). The analysis showed that many arbitrary combinations
of markets with time periods or return quantiles exist for which co-movement is sig-
niﬁcantly elevated. As these sub-samples cannot be related to particular crises events
or extreme return thresholds, any increases in synchronicity during crisis times cannot
necessarily be interpreted as evidence for contagion
Chapter 5 zoomed in on the banking sector, a part of the ﬁnancial system that is be-
lieved to be especially vulnerable to contagion effects. The chapter examined whether
ﬁnancial markets expected bank defaults to be contagious during the 2007 Global Fi-
nancial Crisis. The strategy to identify contagion was based on the presumption that
if ﬁnancial markets expect one bank’s default to cause other banks to suffer losses too,
as implied by the contagion hypothesis, an increase in this bank’s default probability
should lead to a decline in the other banks’ market valuation. For a global sample of
the one hundred largest banks, we tested for contagion by estimating a panel regres-
sion model, explaining changes in banks’ market values from an estimated market
factor and from changes in other banks’ CDS-spreads or default probabilities. The
results indicated that changes in bank market values are correlated due to the com-
mon market factor, but also show that a change in one bank’s CDS-spread or default
probability hardly affects the market’s valuation of other banks in the sample. This
ﬁnding indicates that the observed declines in banks’ market value during the crisis
can hardly be explained by contagion effects, but are predominantly due to adverse
common shocks affecting the banking sector as a whole.
That contagion risks are small compared to the impact of common shocks was also
the main ﬁnding of Chapter 6. This chapter used an event study approach to examine
the impact of news about Greece and news about a Greek bailout on bank stock prices
in 2010 using data for 48 European banks. Only news about the Greek bailout turned
out to have a signiﬁcant effect on bank stock prices, even on stock prices of banks112 Chapter 7
without any exposure to Greece or other highly indebted euro area countries. News
about the economic situation in Greece did not lead to excess returns in bank stock
prices. This result suggests that news about the bailout acts as a common shock affect-
ing banks’ market values, with markets interpreting this news as a signal of European
governments’ willingness in general to use public funds to combat the ﬁnancial crisis.
Consistent with this interpretation, the price of sovereign debt of Portugal, Ireland,
and Spain responds to news about the Greek bailout as well. However, these bond
prices are also found to respond to news about the economic situation of Greece. A
plausible explanation for this impact of news about Greece on the bond prices of other
highly indebted countries is that there is a ’wake-up call’: a crisis initially restricted to
one country may provide new information prompting investors to reassess the vulner-
ability of other countries, which spreads the crisis across borders. Such learning effects
are not to be confused with the impact of ﬁnancial contagion.
All in all, the results from the previous chapters suggest that the role of contagion
in explaining simultaneous instability across ﬁnancial markets and institutions is rel-
atively small compared to the impact of common shocks. Naturally, there are caveats
to this result. An important one is that markets might not price contagion risk, either
because they are inefﬁcient or because investors believe with certainty that the con-
sequences of any contagion will be fully mitigated by ﬁnancial supervisors and gov-
ernment rescue operations. This explanation still implies, however, that the observed
market turmoil cannot be due to investors fearing for contagion. An alternative ex-
planation, of course, is that the analyses adopted are inadequate for reasons unknown
at the time of writing. Nonetheless, their outcomes highlight that any knee-jerk ref-
erencing to contagion effects is a questionable response when ﬁnancial markets or in-
stitutions become unstable simultaneously. An interesting exercise is therefore to take
the above ﬁndings at face value, and evaluate their implications for economic policy.
In particular, if common adverse shocks rather than ﬁnancial contagion are the main
cause of simultaneous instability across ﬁnancial markets and institutions, this has at
least three policy implications.
First, policy makers should have more attention for the risks stemming from simi-
larities across banks’ balance sheets, since this type of sector homogeneity is an impor-
tant reason that large parts of the ﬁnancial sector can simultaneously become unsta-Conclusion 113
ble. From a social welfare perspective, it could be optimal when banks avoid exposing
themselves to the same type of adverse shocks, and specialise in activities rather than
diversifying across them. Reducing balance sheet similarities this way might prove
more effective to foster ﬁnancial stability than trying to identify ‘systemically impor-
tant’ banks, even though the latter attempts have until now received most attention
from policy makers. The analysis in Chapter 2 showed that limiting bank maturity
transformation though imposing liquidity requirements could be an effective means
to reduce similarities between banks, and thereby reduce their exposure to common
shocks.
Second, the opacity of banks’ and other ﬁnancial intermediaries’ balance sheets
might have caused investors to erroneously interpret some adverse shocks to one or
a few banks as a common shock to the banking sector as a whole. Under asymmetric
information, investors will evaluate the value or riskiness of their own bank’s assets
using public signals about the asset quality of other banks. A bad signals can then lead
to a classic lemons’ market effect as described by Akerlof (1970), which is likely to have
played an important role in the drying up of the market for complex mortgage-backed
securities. To reduce its vulnerability to such effects, each bank should provide trans-
parency about the composition of its balance sheet. This increases investor knowledge
about the quality of bank assets, so that banks become less dependent on investor ‘con-
ﬁdence’ therein. Imposing objective accounting rules based on market valuation and
requiring full consolidation and disclosure of risks on banks’ balance sheets would be
a natural ﬁrst step.
Third, the use of generally costly bank rescue operations to safeguard ﬁnancial
stability comes under question, since rescuing one troubled bank not so much prevents
contagion to other banks, but merely assures these other banks’ ﬁnanciers that once
needed they will receive a bailout as well. While during a crisis such rescue operations
could have a stabilising effect, they can become a source of instability when doubts
arise about governments’ ability to live up to their (implicit) promises. In addition, if
banks anticipate any rescue operations by increasing their risk-taking in good times,
the ex ante contribution of such bailouts to ﬁnancial stability becomes rather limited.
The actual bailout then becomes nothing more than the transfer of a subsidy that was
already factored into banks’ business models and risk management policies. Such114 Chapter 7
implicit guarantees reduce market participants’ regard for economic fundamentals,
and sow the seeds of a future ﬁnancial crisis.
The ﬁndings in this thesis also have some implications for future research. The the-
oretical model in the ﬁrst part related bank risk-taking to the term structure of interest
rates, with a larger spread between long-term and short-term interest rates stimulat-
ing banks to take more risk. As a steeper term structure is generally associated with an
upswing in the business cycle, the model suggests a source of pro-cyclicality in bank
risk-taking that is unexplored in the literature. It also suggests additional research
into monetary policy, which through its impact on the term spread could affect bank
risk-taking as well. The second, empirical part of this thesis calls for new research into
the nature of similarities across ﬁnancial markets and institutions, so as to gain more
insight into their vulnerability to adverse common shocks. The literature’s focus on
ﬁnancial contagion as the main source of ﬁnancial system instability has left this area
largely unexplored. Filling in this gap is however outside the scope of the present the-
sis, which merely provides some evidence that contagion is not as omnipresent as is
generally believed. By showing that this ﬁnding has implications for economic policies
to prevent and manage ﬁnancial crises, it aims to trigger the reader in thinking care-
fully about the question of whether ﬁnancial system instability is due to contagion, or
to common shocks? Doing so would be valuable for both academics and policy makers
alike.Chapter 8
Samenvatting (Summary in
Dutch)116 Chapter 8
Sinds 2007 hebben zich op de ﬁnanci¨ ele markten ontwikkelingen voorgedaan die
totdatmomentvoorvrijwelonmogelijkwerdengehouden. Watoorspronkelijkbeperkt
leek tot de wanbetaling op een aantal slechte Amerikaanse hypotheekleningen, ging
over in de grootste ﬁnanci¨ ele crisis sinds de depressie van de jaren dertig uit de vorige
eeuw. Tijdens deze crisis crashten aandelenbeurzen, stegen risicopremies tot grote
hoogten, droogden geldmarkten op, gingen ﬁnanci¨ ele instellingen bankroet, en balan-
ceerden zelfs nationale overheden op de rand van een faillissement. Terwijl zulke
gebeurtenissen op zichzelf zelden voorkomen, hebben zij inmiddels geleid tot wat
bekend staat als de Mondiale Financi¨ ele Crisis van 2007 en daarna. Deze plotselinge
samenkomstvanrisico’smaaktdatdemogelijkhedentotrisicospreidingafnemenwan-
neer zij juist het hardst nodig zijn, en vormt een substanti¨ ele bedreiging vormt voor de
stabiliteit van het ﬁnancieel stelsel.
Het zich gelijktijdig materialiseren van risico’s heeft bij investeerders en beleids-
makers de angst aangewakkerd dat instabiliteit overslaat tussen ﬁnanci¨ ele markten
en instellingen, waarbij instabiliteit van ´ e´ en markt ertoe leidt dat ook andere mark-
ten worden gedestabiliseerd. Verwijzend naar een term uit de medische wetenschap
wordt dit fenomeen ook wel aangeduid als besmetting. Hoewel de economische lite-
ratuur dit begrip nog niet eenduidig heeft weten te deﬁni¨ eren, beschouwen beleids-
makers en het grote publiek ﬁnanci¨ ele besmetting als de voor de hand liggende boos-
doener wanneer verschillende delen van het ﬁnancieel stelsel gelijktijdig instabiel wor-
den.
Hoewel zij vaak met elkaar worden geassocieerd, is gelijktijdige instabiliteit van ﬁ-
nanci¨ ele markten of instellingen niet per deﬁnitie het gevolg van besmetting. Immers,
behalve dat instabiliteit van de ene markt of instelling de oorzaak kan zijn van insta-
biliteit van de andere, kunnen beide markten of instellingen ook gelijktijdig instabiel
zijn geworden door een negatieve gemeenschappelijke schok. Een simpel voorbeeld
van zo’n gemeenschappelijke schok is een wereldwijde toename van risico-aversie on-
der investeerders, wat er bijvoorbeeld toe leidt dat internationale aandelenmarkten
dalen ook zonder dat er een directe economische relatie tussen hen bestaat. Correlatie
van instabiliteit tussen ﬁnanci¨ ele markten en instellingen impliceert dus niet automa-
tisch dat er sprake is van besmetting. In de context van een ﬁnanci¨ ele crisis kan een
parallel worden getrokken met een domino-effect: de dominostenen kunnen omvallenSamenvatting 117
doordat de ´ e´ en de ander aanstoot (besmetting), of doordat een windvlaag ze allen
omblaast zonder dat er interactie tussen hen is (gemeenschappelijke schok). Beide
effecten hebben zeer verschillende implicaties voor beleidsmakers die het ﬁnanci¨ ele
systeem willen stabiliseren. Als het grootste risico voortkomt uit besmetting dan is het
stabiliseren van ´ e´ en dominosteen voldoende om ook alle andere overeind te houden,
terwijl in het geval van een gemeenschappelijke schok de dominostenen alleen kunnen
worden gestabiliseerd door het openstaande raam te sluiten.
Het kernprobleem bij het in de praktijk onderscheiden van besmetting en gemeen-
schappelijke schokken als oorzaken van ﬁnanci¨ ele instabiliteit, is dat veel gemeen-
schappelijke schokken niet direct meetbaar zijn. Empirisch onderzoek naar het meten
van ﬁnanci¨ ele besmetting begint daarom doorgaans met het formuleren van enkele
veronderstellingen over het tijdsverloop van deze schokken, en beschouwt vervol-
gens de correlatie tussen ﬁnanci¨ ele markten die niet met deze aannames kan worden
verklaard als het resultaat van besmettingseffecten. Omdat verschillende economen
uiteenlopende veronderstellingen hanteren, is de vraag of tijdens ﬁnanci¨ ele crises be-
smetting tussen markten optreedt nog steeds onderwerp van discussie in de literatuur.
Om dezelfde reden als hierboven is ook besmetting tussen ﬁnanci¨ ele instellingen
onderwerp van discussie, waarbij de aandacht met name uitgaat naar de bankensec-
tor. Opvallend in dit verband is een speech uit 2010 van Thomas Huertas, destijds
vicevoorzitter van het Europese Comit´ e van Bankentoezichthouders. Huertas betoogt
dat de bijna volledige instorting van het ﬁnancieel stelsel na het faillissement van
Lehman Brothers op 15 September 2008 niet zozeer te wijten was aan besmettingsef-
fecten veroorzaakt door het faillissement, maar aan de gemeenschappelijke schok die
uitgingvandeplotselingetwijfelvaninvesteerdersaandebereidheidencapaciteitvan
de Amerikaanse overheid om omvallende banken met staatsteun te hulp te komen.
Dit proefschrift analyseert in welke mate gelijktijdige instabiliteit van ﬁnanci¨ ele
markten en instellingen te wijten is aan ﬁnanci¨ ele besmetting, en in welke mate deze
een gevolg is van negatieve gemeenschappelijke schokken. Dit thema vormt de rode
draad door de hoofdstukken. Hoofdstuk 2 kiest hierbij een theoretisch perspectief,
terwijl de hoofdstukken daarna een empirische benadering hanteren.
Hoofdstuk 2 laat binnen een theoretisch model zien dat gemeenschappelijke schok-
keneenbelangrijkeverklaringkunnenzijnvoorhetfeitdatbankenvaakgelijktijdigin-118 Chapter 8
stabiel worden. Het model zet uiteen hoe het verstrekken van liquiditeitsteun door de
monetaire autoriteiten een stimulans aan banken geeft om dezelfde soort risico’s te ne-
men, met als gevolg dat hun balansen sterk op elkaar gaan lijken. Banken anticiperen
op liquiditeitsteun door dezelfde ﬁnancieringstructuur te kiezen: weinig eigen vermo-
gen en veel kortlopende schuld. Daarnaast leidt de verwachting van liquiditeitsteun
ertoe dat banken hun activa diversiﬁ¨ eren in plaats van zich in enkele activiteiten te
specialiseren, waardoor winsten en verliezen meer samenvallen tussen banken. Beide
effecten zorgen ervoor dat de bankensector homogener wordt en kwetsbaar is voor
gemeenschappelijke schokken.
Hoofdstuk 3 geeft een overzicht van de verschillende deﬁnities van besmetting die
in de empirische literatuur worden gehanteerd. Vervolgens laat het hoofdstuk zien
dat de literatuur over besmetting tussen internationale aandelenmarkten de omvang
van besmettingseffecten vaak overschat, door zich te richten op koersmutaties omge-
rekend naar Amerikaanse dollars. Wanneer de koersmutaties in twee te vergelijken
markten naar dollars worden omgerekend in plaats van in de lokale munteenheid te
worden uitgedrukt, worden de in beide markten gemeten koersmutaties immers op
dezelfde manier vertekend door ﬂuctuaties in de dollarkoers. Een stijging van de
dollarkoers leidt dan op beide markten tot een daling van de in dollars uitgedrukte
aandelenkoersen, en cree¨ ert daarmee de schijn van besmetting tussen deze markten
zonder dat hier daadwerkelijk sprake van is. Deze vertekening kan worden vermeden
door zich te richten op koersmutaties uitgedrukt in de lokale munteenheid.
Hoofdstuk 4 analyseert besmetting tussen aandelenmarkten. Deze vorm van be-
smettingwordtvaakonderzochtdooreenmarkttekiezendieals‘bron’kangeldenvan
mogelijke besmettingseffecten tijdens een periode die als ‘crisis’ wordt aangemerkt.
De keuze voor de ‘bron’ en de ‘crisis’ is doorgaans op veronderstellingen gebaseerd.
Besmetting wordt vervolgens gedeﬁnieerd als het bovengemiddeld sterk samenvallen
van koersmutaties in andere markten met mutaties in de bronmarkt tijdens de crisis-
periode. Hoofdstuk 4 laat echter zien dat ook regelmatig van zulke samenvallende
koersmutaties sprake is wanneer de ‘bron’ en de ‘crisis’ volstrekt willekeurig wor-
den gekozen. Dit resultaat suggereert dat het bovengemiddeld sterk samenvallen van
koersﬂuctuaties tussen markten op zichzelf niet voldoende is om van besmetting te
kunnen spreken.Samenvatting 119
Hoofdstuk 5 richt zich op het meten van besmetting in de bankensector, en onder-
zoekt in welke mate ﬁnanci¨ ele marktpartijen verwachtten dat bankfaillissementen tij-
dens de Mondiale Financi¨ ele Crisis besmettelijk zouden zijn. De methode is gebaseerd
op het uitgangspunt dat wanneer markten verwachten dat een faillissement van de
enebankzalleidentotbesmettingvandeandere, eentoenameindefaillissementskans
van de ene zal leiden tot een afname van de beurswaarde van de andere. Wij toetsen
of sprake is van dit effect in een steekproef van de honderd grootste Amerikaanse en
Europese banken tijdens de periode 2007–2009. De analyse laat zien dat de markt-
waardes van banken onderling sterk gecorreleerd zijn, maar dat deze marktwaardes
amper worden be¨ ınvloed door veranderingen in de faillissementskans van andere
banken. Dit resultaat suggereert dat besmettingseffecten maar een zeer geringe rol
hebben gespeeld bij de dalende marktwaardes van banken tijdens de Mondiale Fi-
nanci¨ ele Crisis.
Hoofdstuk 6 onderzoekt de Griekse schuldencrisis, in het bijzonder of voor het jaar
2010 nieuws over Griekenland en nieuws over een mogelijke redding van Grieken-
land invloed hebben op de marktwaardes van Europese banken en staatsobligaties.
Het blijkt dat alleen nieuws over een Griekse redding de marktwaarde van banken
be¨ ınvloedt, zelfs wanneer deze banken niet hebben belegd in staatsobligaties van Grie-
kenland of andere Eurolanden met hoge schuldniveaus (Ierland, Portugal en Spanje).
Dit resultaat illustreert dat nieuws over reddingsoperaties het effect heeft van een
gemeenschappelijke schok, waarbij marktpartijen na nieuws over een eventuele red-
ding van Griekenland hun verwachtingen bijstellen over de bereidheid van Europese
overheden in het algemeen om met publiek geld de crisis te bestrijden. Deze interpre-
tatie wordt ondersteund door de bevinding dat nieuws over een reddingsoperatie van
Griekenland ook invloed heeft op de marktwaarde van de andere Europese staatsobli-
gaties die zijn onderzocht.
De analyses in dit proefschrift suggereren dat de rol van besmetting als oorzaak
van gelijktijdige instabiliteit van ﬁnanci¨ ele markten en instellingen beperkt is in ver-
houding tot de impact van negatieve gemeenschappelijke schokken. Hoewel bij deze
analyses ook nuanceringen kunnen worden gemaakt, plaatsen zij vraagtekens bij de
vaak reﬂexmatige verwijzingen naar besmetting als verklaring voor gelijktijdige uit-
braken van ﬁnanci¨ ele instabiliteit. De bevindingen hebben bovendien ten minste drie120 Chapter 8
beleidsimplicaties.
Beleidsmakersmoetenmeeraandachthebbenvoordehomogeniteitvandebanken-
sector. De overeenkomsten tussen bankbalansen maken deze sector gevoelig voor
gemeenschappelijke schokken. Vanuit maatschappelijk perspectief kan het daarom
wenselijkzijndatbankenzichspecialisereninactiviteiteninplaatsvantussenverschil-
lende activiteiten te diversiﬁ¨ en. Door op deze manier overeenkomsten tussen bankba-
lansen te verkleinen wordt de ﬁnanci¨ ele stabiliteit vermoedelijk meer bevorderd dan
door het voorkomen van besmettingseffecten na het faillissement van een ‘systeemre-
levante’ ﬁnanci¨ ele instelling. De analyse in Hoofdstuk 2 laat zien dat het opleggen van
strenge liquiditeitseisen die looptijdtransformatie terugdringen de homogeniteit van
de bankensector effectief beperkt.
Tentweedemoetdeondoorzichtigheidvanbankbalansenwordenteruggedrongen.
Dit voorkomt dat investeerders negatieve schokken die slechts een beperkt aantal
banken treffen ten onrechte interpreteren als schokken die gemeenschappelijk zijn
voor de sector als geheel. Wanneer balansen van banken ondoorzichtig zijn gebruiken
investeerders nieuw beschikbare informatie over de gezondheid van de ene bank im-
mers ook om hun oordeel over de gezondheid van andere banken bij te stellen. Dit ef-
fect kan een belangrijke rol hebben gespeeld in het opdrogen van de markt voor com-
plexe hypotheekobligaties. Om de kwetsbaarheid van banken voor dit soort lemons’
market effecten te verminderen, moeten banken meer informatie verstrekken over hun
balanssamenstelling en hun activa zoveel mogelijk waarderen op de actuele markt-
waarde. Dit vergroot het inzicht van investeerders in het bancaire risicobeheer, zodat
banken minder afhankelijk worden van hun ‘vertrouwen’ daarin.
Ten derde kunnen vraagtekens worden geplaatst bij pogingen van overheden om
met kostbare steunoperaties aan individuele banken de ﬁnanci¨ ele stabiliteit te waar-
borgen. Wanneer gemeenschappelijke schokken de belangrijkste bron zijn van insta-
biliteit, werkt het redden van de ene bank immers hooguit stabiliserend voor andere
banken door te suggereren dat deze andere banken indien nodig ook op staatsteun
kunnen rekenen. Op het hoogtepunt van een crisis hebben zulke reddingsoperaties
weliswaar een stabiliserend effect, maar zij kunnen ook een bron van instabiliteit wor-
den wanneer twijfels in de markt ontstaan over het vermogen van overheden om hun
(impliciete) garanties gestand te doen. Wanneer banken bovendien in goede tijdenSamenvatting 121
op reddingsoperaties anticiperen door meer risico te nemen, wordt de daadwerkelijke
redding gereduceerd tot de uitbetaling van een subsidie die banken reeds in hun be-
drijfsmodel en risicobeheersing hebben verdisconteerd. Dit soort garanties ondermijnt
de disciplinerende werking van ﬁnanci¨ ele markten en legt de kiem voor een nieuwe
ﬁnanci¨ ele crisis.References
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